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A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for
Credibility Impeachment
CHARLES N. W. KECKLER*
But where are these practical psychological tests, which will detect
specifically the memory-failure and the lie on the witness-stand? ... If
there is ever devised a psychological test for the valuation of witnesses,
the law will run to meet it.... Whenever the Psychologist is really
ready for the Courts, the Courts are ready for him.'
INTRODUCTION
The premise of this Article is simple: "the Psychologist" is almost
ready for "the Courts" several decades after Wigmore began waiting for
him, but the Courts must be made ready, rather than be relied upon to
"rush to embrace" any advances in detecting deception. Since technology
now allows the observation of the internal neurological processes by
which deceptive information is produced, an observer adjudicating
credibility need no longer be limited to the psychosomatic responses
measured by either demeanor observation or polygraph interpretation,
which are poorly correlated in principle, and practice, to deceptive acts.
In Part I, this Article describes and evaluates the scientific changes that
have created this potential for detecting deception, which is only just
beginning to be exploited. A major element has been the expansion of
cognitive neuroscience, which is a theoretical orientation toward mental
phenomena that first characterizes with precision the information and
processing steps needed to accomplish some mental task, and secondly
identifies within the brain those structures that actually perform the
* Visiting Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law. Ph.D. (all but
dissertation, Human Evolutionary Ecology), University of New Mexico; J.D., University of Michigan,
1999; M.A. (Anthropology), University of Michigan, 1992; A.B., Harvard College, 199o. Initial
research for this Article occurred during my residence as John M. Olin Fellow at Northwestern
University School of Law. Further support during the preparation of the Article was provided by both
the Law and Economics Center, and the National Center for Technology and Law, both located at
George Mason University School of Law. The author may be reached at ckeckler@gmu.edu.
I. JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 875 (2d ed. 1935).
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information processing steps involved. It is the recent technological
changes in brain imaging, particularly the visualization of the brain while
it is actively working-so called "functional imaging"-that have allowed
cognitive neuroscience the potential to identify relatively subtle
processes such as deception. Moreover, the ability to examine in real
time the response of the subject brain during a question and answer
session makes it feasible to use this technique forensically, so long as the
pattern of brain activity corresponding to deception is sufficiently well-
characterized.
In order to more precisely specify the research and evidentiary
potential of this technique, I break down deception into three different
types of mental operations, which show distinct patterns and differ in
their practical or potential tractability to accurate measurement. Perhaps
the most straightforward testing paradigm is feigned ignorance,
sometimes called "guilty knowledge" in polygraph literature,' or
malingering.3 In this mental operation, it is relevant whether the subject
knows X or not; the deceptive subject (falsely) denies knowledge of X,
and the detection of deception device (DDD) attempts to accurately
distinguish between the presence and absence of X, which, respectively
would either bolster or contradict this denial. More problematic but
potentially more valuable is the use of a DDD in the classic
circumstances of the lie, wherein the subject is asked as to the fact of
some matter and instead of responding sincerely with X, responds with
Y, a falsehood about that state of affairs to which X also refers. The
DDD in this context is required to accurately identify when the subject's
brain is formulating a verbal response in conflict with a (different and
presumably sincere) response evoked directly from the subject's
memory. Most generally and most problematically, we would ideally like
to detect deception when the subject is neither denying knowledge nor
uttering falsehoods, but is simply misleading the questioner because they
have a subjective intent to deceive. Note that it is only in this final
paradigm that we are actually measuring "deception" per se, rather than
mental operations that may distinguish deception from normal
communication. Hypothetically, a DDD could be used to identify the
presence of this intent in the subject.
4
2. Gershon Ben-Shakhar et al., Trial by Polygraph: Reconsidering the Use of the Guilty
Knowledge Technique in Court, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 527, 530 (2002).
3. See Douglas Mossman, Daubert, Cognitive Malingering, and Test Accuracy, 27 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 229, 231 (2003).
4. This type of deception, of course, encompasses the preceding two kinds; that is, if there truly
were a DDD capable of showing intent to deceive, a subject denying knowledge he possesses, or
choosing to utter a lie, would be detected by the intent-more specifically, the hypothetical distinctive
cognitive planning necessary to deceive-that necessarily preceded his deceptive behavior. It should
be pointed out that none of these definitions precisely track the law of perjury, which would require a
false material statement (and this can be a denial of knowledge), along with criminal intent. See
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The goal and measure of a DDD will be to demonstrate accuracy in
terms of empirical sensitivity (picking up all instances of the deception
type) and specificity (not picking up other phenomena not demonstrating
deception). As statistical measures, sensitivity corresponds to a low rate
of "Type II" errors, sometimes called "false negatives," while specificity
reduces "Type I" errors, or "false positives." Moreover, the test will also
have to possess sufficient theoretical justification for what it measures in
order to satisfy all the scientific criteria for admissibility. Along with
discussing neuroimaging, and in particular, functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), as the most promising techniques to lay the
groundwork of this research, I also discuss in a more cursory fashion the
use of electroencephalograms (EEGs). Instead of showing actual brain
structures, these devices record electrical activity throughout the brain by
the attachment of external electrodes, and have been promoted under
the label "brain fingerprinting" as a DDD for denied knowledge; in
addition, I will occasionally for purposes of contrast, discuss the
polygraph research as it relates to the denied knowledge, the lie, or the
intent to deceive paradigms.
Having reviewed the facts, I present in Part II a method of
potentially integrating this research into the legal arena, beginning with
an assessment under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, of its capacity to
satisfy the scientific criteria of admissibility. In order to create a
"virtuous cycle" of increasing accuracy and increasing court use, I
propose a model that begins with limited admissibility in those contexts
most likely to encourage increased rigor-namely, when the proponent is
adverse to the witness tested, a circumstance that implies the use of fMRI
initially for impeachment rather than substantive evidence. This way
there can be mutual benefit for civil plaintiffs and defendants to "cross-
examine" the brain of a witness whose credibility has been put in doubt.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Dean Wigmore's confident prediction reflects the dubious quality of
legal judgments of credibility, and the unfilled demand for any form of
accurate assistance. The exclusion of DDDs from the trial setting is no
small part of the history of modem evidence. Until very recently, this
interaction involved only a recapitulation of the perennial questions
surrounding the polygraph, and repeated rejections modeled on the very
Frye' decision which had made the art of the lie detector the gold (or
6perhaps pyrite) standard of an unscientific means to ascertain the truth.
Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 354 (973) (disallowing prosecution for literally true but
misleading statements); United States v. O'Neill, i 16 F.3d 245, 247 (7th Cir. 1997) (allowing successful
perjury prosecution for false denial of knowing particular people in a drug conspiracy).
5. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)..
6. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES 584-
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Hypothetically, at least in the limited universe of civil cases where other
evidence is quite equivocal, even a questionable instrument like the
polygraph might be of value,7 but an absolute bar rather than a
conditional one has always been the rule.8 Or as Justice Thomas put it in
conclusive terms: "A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is
that 'the jury is the lie detector."' 9
This blanket exclusion of a method, of course, provides little
incentive for its scientific improvement. Indeed the polygraph of today
differs little in its essential features (and vices) from the earliest models.'"
Blaming Frye for this, or even the professional interest of the bar, would
be excessive, as the primary culprit is the polygraph itself, whose
theoretical and practical flaws are such that the debate has generally
been whether it is "completely useless" or just "usually useless" (which
suggests also "occasionally useful")." The experience of Massachusetts,
for instance, suggests that even with an incentive to improve, the ability
of the polygraph to progress remains weak. Having recognized the
negative incentives of a blanket prohibition, Massachusetts made
polygraph evidence admissible by discretion, with the explicit hope that
this would cause advocates and researchers to improve their techniques
now that there would be some kind of marginal benefit in the form of
increased admissibility for increased accuracy.'" After waiting more than
a decade, however, Massachusetts reverted to its older rule-noting the
conspicuous failure of the polygraph to respond to the opportunity they
had presented.'3
86 (2002) (giving overview of court treatment).
7. Insofar as an instrument gives results that are even slightly above chance-something that
even strenuous critics of polygraphy, including myself, do not deny-it will alter the probability of
reaching the "correct" result in a case whose probable outcome absent polygraphic evidence is fifty-
fifty. Such circumstances blunt one of the major objections to polygraph evidence, because even if fact-
finders mistakenly believe the device to be more accurate than it actually is, they will arrive (on
average) at the correct legal outcome, their only error of "prejudice" being that they are more
confident of the decision than they ought to be.
8. United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. I997) (holding that the traditional rule
that polygraph evidence is never admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness "is binding upon us
in this case" (emphasis added)); accord United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 311 (1998); United
States v. Prince-Oyibo 320 F.3 d 494, 501 (4 th Cir. 2003).
9. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313. Although this might be so at the present time-it is not
"fundamental" in the way that term is usually employed, as a historically invariant or logically
necessary feature. See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as a Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 579 (1997)
("When and why did the system declare that jurors had the wisdom to arbitrate unvarnished
credibility conflicts at criminal trials? To the question 'when,' the surprising answer is very recently.").
io. Ken Alder, A Social History of Untruth: Lie Detection and Trust in Twentieth-Century
America, 80 REPRESENTATIONS I, I (2002).
it. For an updated version of this debate, see DAVID L. FAGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ch. 1O (2d ed. 2002).
12. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 381 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Mass. 1978).
13. Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35, 35-36 (Mass. 1989).
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Given the stagnation in polygraph technology and technique, the
more interesting question might be why its admissibility remains such a
live and recurrent issue. One explanation might be that some litigants,
when the facts and the law seem to be going against them, may resort to
a polygraph, thinking that a favorable result might occur and they have
in effect nothing to lose (since they would, in the absence of stipulation,
be left free to introduce the test or not). Ceteris paribus, this would
attract those with the weakest cases, who are disproportionately
deceptive in their litigation position. Consequently they would be
attracted by the very unreliability of the polygraph test (and the more
unreliably administered the better for them), since a favorable result
would necessarily be an inaccurate one. Fifty-fifty odds or worse of such
a result (technically, a false negative showing no deception) 4 might be
worth the gamble to such a desperate party. For instance, it might
generate reasonable doubt for a criminal defendant-a common context
for an attempt at polygraph admissibility. 5
Assuming this is part of the answer that explains when admissibility
is actually sought, the more fundamental reason why polygraph evidence
will not "go away" is that it remains relevant to recurrent issues of
credibility in adjudication, and the substitute methods of adjudicating
these issues-usually through the naked eye assessment of witness
demeanor-are not superior to the polygraph. Jurors assess demeanor
evidence when evaluating the credibility of the accompanying statements
14. For purposes of clarity, what I mean by accuracy is a low rate of Type I error, detecting
"something" when there is actually nothing, as well as a low rate of Type II error, detecting "nothing"
when what is being sought for is actually present. A Type I error is sometimes called a "false positive,"
and a Type II error a "false negative." In this Article, the "something" is deception-truth or falsity
itself. I generally avoid these labels, as they would lead to difficult locutions, such as an unwarranted
positive being a "false falsity." Rather, I will speak of the -ates of undetected deceit or "evasions" (the
Type II problem) and truth mischaracterized or "artifacts" (the Type I problem).
15. An uncontrolled "market" for self-administered detection of deception devices has many of
the classic hallmarks of a "market for lemons." George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488-500 (1973). The polygraph is known to
produce errors, at rate E, and different methods and testers have different rates of error, which are not
visible to the consumer. The consumer comes in two types, either honest or deceptive, and therefore
favors a low E or high E, respectively. Quite apart from any estimate of the relative frequency of these
types who become criminal defendants, the chances are that any other evidence in the case will tend to
corroborate honesty and contradict deceit. Therefore, the honest person will find the evidence largely
redundant (at rate I - E) and damaging at rate E -a risk rarely worth taking. The deceitful will more
often find themselves in circumstances where their expected rates of loss exceed i - E, meaning they
attempt a polygraph, because it gives them E chance of an inaccurate result, reasonable doubt, and
acquittal. The rate at which the evidence is admitted is irrelevant to this calculation since it merely
reduces the potential benefit of an erroneous test, without its ceasing to be of marginal benefit. To the
extent the foregoing is true, the less accurate methods of the polygraph will be chosen by the dominant
type of consumer, and the average level of E will increase (or at the very least not fall), meaning the
discipline would become less accurate over time, or least no more accurate. I discuss some ways to get
around this problem of adverse selection. Part II.E infra. In this case, one might say that the
polygraphy industry has taken lemons and learned to make lemonade.
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in an artificial context (the courtroom) under questioning by an "expert"
(the lawyer). So it is hardly distinguishable in form from polygraph
evidence." The fact is that the court uses the human mind as a DDD,
providing it with visual and paraverbal data, and this built-in "device" is
generally inaccurate. 7 Even individuals in law enforcement generally
perform at levels barely above chance,' and they presumably have more
experience and incentive than juries or even judges in assessing
statement credibility. Consequently, the whole process of making
witnesses sweat on the stand, however integral it might be to the self-
image of the bar, is highly dubious as an aid to the truth.'9 Supposing the
polygraph to have improved, but not much, the best that could be said of
live examination over the last century is the same, meaning its relative
value for adjudication has not really changed, and there is still plenty of
demand for greater accuracy in this area. At some level, most courts
realize this, or so one would hope, and this continued and unfilled
demand explains their willingness to reconsider any apparent system
whose improved ability might fill this need.
Moreover, and more importantly, from a biological standpoint,
nonverbal demeanor evidence and polygraph measure are essentially
metrics of the same phenomenon, a general level of sympathetic nervous
system arousal loosely associated with an anticipated risk of detection or
the transgression of norms (fear or embarrassment). The likelihood is
that changes in blood pressure, sweating, and so forth have been used to
assess credibility of accompanying verbal statements since the beginning
of spoken language; likewise these markers have always been
unreliable." What current research offers is what the polygraph
I6. James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903, 937 (2000) (citing the
"disquieting empirical evidence" regarding demeanor credibility).
17. See Holly Orcutt et al., Detecting Deception in Children's Testimony: Factfinders' Abilities to
Reach the Truth in Open Court and Closed Circuit Trials, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339, 365 (2001)
(finding jurors incapable of telling when witnesses are dissembling). "I am led by my investigations to
serious doubt concerning the ability of a trial jury to perform the central task assigned to them: to
assess credibility. And, I must add, insofar as I can determine, the laws of evidence and the
contribution of the trial courts in interpreting and applying the laws do little to enhance confidence."
H. Richard Uvilller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42
DUKE L.J. 776, 778 (1993).
I8. See Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, "He's Guilty!": Investigator Bias in Judgments of
Truth and Deception, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 472 (2002) (showing in a review of studies no effect
of training, except increased likelihood of labeling all individuals as deceitful, yielding more Type II
errors, along with increased false confidence in one's abilities).
19. It is important to distinguish this from the questioning process used to identify inconsistencies
or evasions; this is clearly valuable for credibility purposes, since by fleshing out the witness's account,
its actual level of relative plausibility is more easily assessed. What I question is the marginal value of
conducting this questioning live, in order to achieve parallel transmission of non-verbal demeanor
evidence that will inevitably affect credibility where that is at issue, despite the proven unreliability of
such evidence.
20. A larger anthropological question is implicated by this point, regarding why our system of
[Vol. 57:509
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fundamentally did not, a way to go beyond the external correlates of
deception and into the specific neural processes that underlie the
different types of deceptive behavior.
I. THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF DETECTING DECEPTION
A. THE METHOD OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
The cognitive neuroscience way of looking at the mind is
fundamentally driven by a desire to know how the brain produces
behavior. Computer science has inspired cognitive neuroscience as it has
emerged over the last quarter-century to ask "how a machine with the
physical properties of the brain can produce specific behaviors when
given specific inputs."2' What cognitive scientists mean by "specific" in
this regard is usually defined in terms of an information-processing
goal-or for inputs, a type of information-that can be specified
computationally as a series of steps. For deception, no one has yet
specified precisely what one must do to deceive, because there are many
different kinds of deception, with different demands. What can be noted
is what is not needed as an informational matter. Specifically, it is not
necessary that a person "feel bad" or signal fear or otherwise engage the
body in somatic arousal. Indeed this behavior is probably counter-
productive for what might be taken as the working definition of the
cognitive goal: to induce a belief in the receiver that the sender thinks
plausible but false, a process that entails the receiver supposing a signal
to be one emitted in order to convey information the sender believes to
be true." Consequently, a cognitive neuroscientist would begin the study
verbal communication has apparently stabilized around imperfect deception, given that there are
countervailing selective pressures for a signaler to deceive and for a receiver to detect deception. See
generally Richard W. Byrne, Tracing the Evolutionary Path of Cognition, in THE SOCIAL BRAIN:
EVOLUTION AND PATHOLOGY 43, 43-60 (M. Brune et al. eds., 2003) (inferring that the basic cognitive
equipment necessary for tactical deception arose approximately twelve million years ago in primate
evolution, but that language and consciousness, if not indeed driven by an "arms race" around
deception, have significantly expanded the opportunities for it). Recent research suggests that in
systems with repeated interactions, "bad liars" may be favored. See Paul W. Andrews, The Influence of
Postreliance Detection on the Deceptive Efficacy of Dishonest Signals of Intent: Understanding Facial
Clues to Deceit as the Outcome of Signaling Tradeoffs, 23 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 103, 115 (2002).
This result, which could maintain a mix of types genetically, is in line with a theoretical model that
would assume "tells" (indicators of deception) are not selected against because it will be easier to
forgive and trust someone after a revealed deception if their deceptions are accompanied by "tells";
hence such signals are a form of costly insurance advantageous to certain types. By contrast, if a lie is
sent without such insurance, the "once-bitten, twice-shy" deceived receiver will not be able to
categorize future transmissions and may simply mistrust the sender.
21. FRONTIERS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE xxiv (Stephen M. Kosslyn & Richard M. Anderson,
eds., 1992).
22. There are to be sure inadequacies with this definition-for instance whether merely
concealing an expected signal counts, but these are beside the point for the moment. Note, however,
that this definition does not imply that the receiver is denied "the truth." The deceitful sender may
also be mistaken about what is actually true, and yet may still act to mislead, under this definition, as
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of deception not by looking at bodily arousal as is the case with
polygraphy or the visual observations of stress reactions, but by
examining "directly the organ that produces lies, the brain.., identifying
specific patterns of neural activation that underlie deception."23
Ideally, problem specification in cognitive neuroscience is to be done
quite apart from, and prior to, actually looking at the physical properties
and relationships of groups of neurons, which founding cognitive
neuroscientists, such as Marr, referred to as the "level of
implementation."24 The implementation level corresponds conceptually
to building a working piece of computing technology, and was contrasted
by Marr with the computational level of "abstract problem analysis,"
which consisted of decomposing the problem into its primary parts (for
example, the need to combine visual data from two eyes into a single
image, and then to store this image). The intermediate level for Marr was
that of the algorithm, giving a formal "programming" procedure that
would in principle yield the right output for the inputs.25 Once these
levels had been penetrated the researcher would see how one would
actually build this machine out of neurons within the brain (or rather,
how evolution had potentially done so). In practice, however, these
levels are not pursued independently, because the structure and
organization of the brain acts not only to constrain theorizing, but to
suggest more basically "what problems need to be solved," as well as
giving hints about how the brain actually does solve them by processing
information.
Therefore, an inquiry into detection of fabricated responses would
begin quite differently from the polygraph, if this inquiry were informed
by cognitive neuroscience. The first theoretical goal would be to define
how to build a machine for lying, 6 not one for lie detection-because the
structure of the latter must be wholly dependent on the structure of the
what he (the deceiver) thinks is true. Accord Augustine, De Mendacio, 3 (lying is the intentional
negation of the subjective truth). This is close to the working definition used by biological researchers
for tactical deception, which is said to involve a "successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without
forewarning, to create in another a belief which the communicator considers to be untrue." Sean A.
Spence et al., A Cognitive Neurobiological Account of Deception: Evidence from Functional
Neuroimaging, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOCIETY B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 1755, 1755 (2004)
(quoting with approval the definition employed by A. Vrij & S. Mann, Telling and Detecting Lies in a
High-Stake Situation: The Case of a Convicted Murderer, 15 APPLIED COGNrTVE PSYCHOL. 187-203
(2oo1)).
23. G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13
CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 830 (2003).
24. See FRONTIERS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 21, at xxiii.
25. See Terrence J. Sejnowski & Patricia Smith Churchland, Brain and Cognition, in
FOUNDATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE, 299, 302-03 (Michael A. Posner ed., 1989) (discussing Marr's
theories, especially as articulated in DAVID MARR, VISION (1982)).




former. Only by understanding the nature of the device we possess for
lying to other human beings could we hope to build another external
machine that detects when this internal machine is operating. For
precision greater than the detector we already possess, it is necessary to
identify those distinct processes involved in implementing "the lying
function," an identification that is greatly facilitated by knowing (I) what
additional information or operations are needed to create a lie as
opposed to uttering the truth, and (2) where in the brain information and
operations of this type are performed.
Hence, a function-driven perspective is melded with a traditional
approach in neuropsychology, which, starting from a "natural history" of
the brain, sought to identify what various anatomical structures did and
how they did it. One way to characterize the distinction is that cognitive
neuroscience starts with the question of what tasks the brain must
accomplish in order to carry out its functions, and then goes looking in
the neuroanatomy for the mechanisms that actually accomplish these
tasks. By contrast, the more traditional approach, which was often tied to
the clinical examination of patients with particular injuries, would begin
with the anatomical structure and go on to infer its function from its
observed effect on behavior." Put more simply, the ultimate goal of
cognitive neuroscience was to identify the neurological origin for every
behavior that the brain performs, and the ultimate goal of
neuropsychology was to find the associated behavioral function for every
piece of the brain. These questions ultimately converge.
One of the most important techniques carried over from the
naturalistic study of neuroanatomy is the identification of the
dissociation and double dissociation of different cognitive capacities,
which show the independence of different types of information
processing." A dissociation between cognitive functions is demonstrated
when the first function (for example, short term memory) disappears
although a similar function (for example, long-term memory) remains. A
double dissociation is more informative, because it more conclusively
shows independence of the capacities. This would occur if there were
also cases where long-term memory disappeared but the individual could
recall material in the short term. For many years, such dissociations-
describing the way cognition is "carved at the joints"-were
painstakingly identified through the study and comparison of brain-
27. In this context, clinical neuropsychology would attempt to find what one might term a
"clinical George Washington" someone "who could not tell a lie," literally, because they lacked the
equipment to do so. (This is unlike the punctilious truth-teller, of whom it is more accurate to say that
they would not tell a lie.) See generally CHARLES V. FORD, LIES! LIES! LIES! THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECEIT
(1996) (noting that certain psychological deficits, such as autism, can create an excess of honesty).
28. ROSALEEN A. MCCARTHY & ELIZABETH K. WARRINGTON, COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY: A
CLINICAL INTRODUCTION 17 (I99o).
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damaged patients with peculiar deficits. To the extent function could be
tied to structure, the nature of the patient's injury would provide the
basis for any inference, even when it was difficult to tell exactly the role
the damaged part played in the lost behavior (that is, the most that one
could infer was that the anatomical structure was somehow necessary).
Neuroimaging allows one to pose a particular task and observe the
parts of the brain that respond to it, and consequently has obvious
advantages over the adventitious method formerly used to identify
anatomical correlates, making it the most important methodological
advance for cognitive neuroscience." Nevertheless, the logic of inquiry as
sketched above, although greatly accelerated, remains the same: if a
structure (usually a group of interlinked structures) is activated by one
task, but not by other similar tasks, the tasks can be considered
dissociated, and if the second task activates a distinct pattern or
"signature," there is double dissociation and "independence"-although
the more complex picture of the brain revealed by neuroimaging usually
shows overlaps for those processing steps common to both tasks. As one
commentator acknowledges:
With the development of functional imaging techniques capable of
monitoring the brain's physiological response to cognitive tasks,
researchers are rapidly gaining insight into the neural mechanisms that
underlie vision, sensation, hearing, movement, language, learning,
memory, and certain sex differences in language processing. Functional
neuroimaging allows researchers to confirm long-standing
hypotheses -first formulated from neuropsychological testing of brain-
damaged patients-about structure-function relationships in the
normal brain."0
The result of this type of empirical work, together with the task-
based orientation of cognitive neuroscience, led it to view the mind as
essentially "modular." Without delving too deeply into the various
debates over how modular,3 it is enough to simply note that there are
"[f]unctional and/or anatomical components that are relatively
specialized to process only certain kinds of information.'32 The modular
29. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 136 (Michael S. Gazzaniga et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) ("The most
exciting methodological advances for cognitive neuroscience have been provided by new imaging
techniques [that] ... enable researchers to identify brain regions that are activated during these tasks,
and to test hypotheses about functional anatomy.").
30. Jennifer Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball?, 49
STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1258 (1997) (considering primarily, and skeptically, the potential role of this
technology in diminished capacity or insanity defenses).
31. See STEPHEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE 39-41 & passim (2OO2) (discussing different views on
this point, as well as the broader implications of the modular view for the psychological and social
sciences).
32. Ralph Adolphs, Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Social Behavior, 4 NATURE REv.
NEUROSCIENCE 165, 166 (2003) (noting "evidence of domain-specific processing that is specialized for
specific ecological categories (such as faces and social contract violations)").
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view has been particularly conducive to evolutionary theorizing, because
the "cognitive task" can be recharacterized as a relatively discrete
adaptive problem to be solved by natural selection, the ultimate result of
this being a specialized mental organ adapted to fulfill the information
processing need of the organism.33 As applied to the study of deception,
this does not necessarily indicate there exists a "module" for deception,34
since deceit is an ancient biological feature that is part of many different
social behaviors and predates the evolution of language,35 although some
would argue language led it to a new efflorescence of complexity." On
the other hand, an ambitious detection of deception project would rely
on the possibility that there may be features that are distinctive to and
common among the class of tasks we can identify as deceptive, even if
those tasks show significant variation among them.
B. ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAMS AND THE "BRAIN FINGERPRINTING"
METHOD
Before examining the application of neuroimaging to deception in
more detail, it may be useful to distinguish this technique from an
alternative method of monitoring mental activity, already being applied
to some extent as a way of measuring deception. An event-related
potential (ERP)37 is recorded by an electrode on the skull of a subject
performing some task, and usually presented as a set of waveforms on an
electroencephalogram (EEG). Because actual brain activity is electrical,
this is a direct measure of the presence of information processing.
However, the primary drawback is that the electrical activity impinging
on the skull electrode is very difficult to localize to a particular piece of
33. For a recent articulation of the cognitive neuroscience framework, with several suggested
applications to legal theory concerned with decision-making processes, see Terence Chorvat & Kevin
McCabe, The Brain and the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANSACLIONS ROYAL SOCIETY B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
1727-36 (2004). See also the other articles in this special issue devoted to legal neurobiology,
especially Owen D. Jones, Law, Evolution and the Brain: Applications and Open Questions, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOCIETY B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 1697-1707 (2004).
34. See Spence et al., supra note 22, at 176o-6i (giving a brief discussion of forensic potential and
pitfalls for investigations and determinations of responsibility and mitigation).
35. Robin Dunbar, On the Origin of the Human Mind, in EvOLUTION AND THE HUMAN MIND:
MODULARITY, LANGUAGE, AND META-COGNMON 238-53 (Peter Carruthers & Andrew Chamberlain
eds., 2000) (showing that the frequency of tactical deception increases with the size of the neocortex in
primate species).
36. ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EvOLUTION 416 (1985) ("In human evolution, processes of deception
and self-deception were greatly heightened by the advent of language. Language permits individuals to
make statements about events distant in time and space, and these are least amenable to contradiction.
Thus, language permits verbal deception of many different kinds.").
37. Technically, what one does is to extract from the background EEG, which records all the
ongoing electrical activity of the brain, the particular waveform that was triggered by the stimulus. See
Adolphs, supra note 32, at 166 ("Electrical potentials... are generated in the brain as a consequence
of the synchronized activation of neuronal networks by external stimuli. These evoked potentials are
recorded at the scalp and consist of precisely timed sequences of waves or 'components."').
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neuroanatomy within the "black box" of the brain."'
As in neuroimaging, or polygraphy for that matter, the goal of the
EEG deception researcher is to find a distinctive "signature" associated
with a deceptive response. An EEG will not reveal precisely why and
how the signature is created; in this sense it is much like a polygraph.
However, consistent with cognitive neuroscience and unlike polygraphy,
the brain-based measure used is more closely tied to the cognitive
activity required for the deception to occur, as opposed to more
contingent physiological correlates such as sweating or blood pressure.
The type of deception that has attracted the most attention in this area is
guilty knowledge. As general research into ERP and memory has
demonstrated, there exist consistently different reactions of the brain in
response to "significant" (i.e., remembered) information as opposed to
non-significant information. Consequently, if a person was genuinely
unfamiliar with a piece of evidence X (say a damning memo or a murder
weapon), he should treat it as no more "significant" than similar memos
or weapons with which they are presented. This marker for the reaction
is a particular waveform commonly known as the P300 wave (indicating
its position next to the parietal lobe, which is involved in memory and
recall).
One clinical application of this technique is the detection of
"malingerers," people who pretend for a variety of reasons, including for
fraudulent insurance or legal claims, to possess an illness they do not
have.39 Psychologists attempt to spot those pretending to be brain
damaged by giving such patients memory tests. Genuinely disabled
people will of course not recognize a stimulus they have forgotten, while
fakers will feign ignorance although the P300 wave of their brains will be
consistent with the item being significant.4' Current approaches allow the
classification of approximately eighty-seven percent of the deceptive
subjects, with no misclassification of truthful subjects." A series of
laboratory studies in which subjects were given incentives to lie about
"guilty knowledge" of a simulated crime showed an ability to correctly
classify ninety-six percent of the subjects as honest or deceptive.'
The forensic use of this technique has acquired the sobriquet of
"brain fingerprinting,"'43 although its primary promoter, Dr. Lawrence
38. The use of several different electrodes is common, providing some capacity to "triangulate"
through differential levels of activity what broad region of the brain is being used.
39. See Mossman, supra note 3, at 231 (discussing case law involving possible feigning of cognitive
deficits to avoid standing trial and for other reasons).
40. See J. Peter Rosenfeld et al., P3oo Scalp Amplitude Distribution as an Index of Deception in a
Simulated Cognitive Deficit Model, 33 INT'L J. PSYCHOPH-vSIOLOGv 3, 17 (1999).
41. See id. at 16.
42. See John J. B. Allen & William G. Iacono, A Comparison of Methods for the Analysis of
Event-Related Potentials in Deception Detection, 34 PSYCHOPIvSIOLOGV 234, 234-40 (1997).
43. See 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, SCIENCE IN THE LAW § Io.3.3.I3[2] (2d ed. 2002); Andre A.
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Farwell, refers to it as the Farwell MERMER technique.' In any event,
Farwell has attempted to promote this as a replacement for the
polygraph, but with limited success. Farwell's attempt has received a fair
amount of media interest, particularly after an Iowa court admitted the
technique as competent evidence in 2001."5 More recently, Farwell has
been less successful in introducing this material in Oklahoma, after his
examination of a capital defendant there.46
Despite the hype, the amount of peer-reviewed material available to
study the efficacy of this method is almost nonexistent; it turns out that
much of the basic research was funded and or conducted by the CIA in
the late i98os and early 199os and therefore is publicly unavailable.47 The
CIA terminated its research after Farwell refused to reveal the algorithm
used to analyze the EEG readings, on the basis that he considered it
proprietary. He subsequently appears to have received two patents and
to have gone into the private business of detecting deception," a process
that it seems has hampered the ability of the scientific community to
either validate or build upon his research.49
Moenssens, Brain Fingerprinting- Can It Be Used to Detect the Innocence of Persons Charged With a
Crime?, 70 UMKC L. REV. 891, 893-95 (2002).
44. Lawrence A. Farwell & Sharon S. Smith, Using Brain MERMER Testing to Detect Knowledge
Despite Efforts to Conceal, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 1-9 (2oo) (MERMER is Farwell's acronym for the
particular waveforms he uses, one of which is derived from P3oo).
45. See Brain Fingerprinting Testing Ruled Admissible in Court, at
http://www.brainwavescience.com/Ruled%2oAdmissable.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2006) (asserting
that Farwell's "brain fingerprinting" test led to reversal of murder conviction because the test
supported the defendant's alibi in Harrington v. Iowa, 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003)). But see
Harrington v. Iowa, 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003) (reversing conviction due to prosecution's
commission of a Brady violation without considering the brain fingerprinting test). See also
Moenssens, supra note 43, at 905-07 (discussing expert testimony in this case).
46. See Slaughter v. State, 1O5 P.3 d 832, 834 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005). "Dr. Farwell allegedly
asked numerous details concerning 'salient details of the crime scene that, according to [Petitioner's]
attorneys and the records in the case,... the perpetrator experienced in the course of committing the
crime for which Mr. Slaughter was convicted.' According to Dr. Farwell, Petitioner's brain response to
that information indicated 'information absent."' Id. In part because Farwell failed to provide the
Oklahoma court with a promised report on his work, including the salient details tested or peer
validation of the technique, the court rejected this material as "new evidence" and concluded that
"Brain Fingerprinting, based solely on the MERMER effect, would [not] survive a Daubert analysis."
Id. at 836.
47. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNmNG OFFICE, INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES: FEDERAL AGENCY
VIEWS ON THE POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF "BRAIN FINGERPRINTING" 9, 14 n.I. (200) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT]. Apparently Farwell conducted a forty subject study in which one-half (twenty) of the
subjects had participated in a simulation, and one-half had not. All subjects were then presented with
pictorial stimuli-presumably of the simulation-and their EEGs were compared. Farwell claimed one
hundred percent classification had occurred in that study, which used only the P300 measure. See
Farwell & Smith, supra note 44, at 137.
48. See GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 7 (indicating his acquisition of two patents in 1995).
49. If the history of the polygraph is a guide, commercialization and proprietary control of a
scientific technique is unlikely to improve the technique, at least if this occurs before the background
science is well understood and accepted (which would then allow researchers to compete on relative
accuracy). In an atmosphere of bitter conflict among the early developers of the polygraph, one of
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Nevertheless, other ERP researchers are able to replicate what
Farwell is able to do (or claims to be able to do) in terms of detecting
when subjects deny the significance of significant material. Moreover,
there is some theoretical basis for explaining the electrical activity of the
P300 wave as what is termed an "orienting response" toward surprising
or important information, a response that can be detected by either EEG
or by polygraph, or by a combination of the two. As argued recently by
proponents of using this method forensically, responses to "guilty
knowledge" mediated by an orienting response are not in fact premised
on the type of fear arousal usually associated with measurement made by
the polygraph, but are wholly cognitive, based on the fact that the
organism will focus attention on any item of importance, independent of
how they might emotionally react to this item." The main problem with
the use of the physiological correlates of this response is that they track
the stimulus by periods of up to twenty-five seconds, making them
vulnerable to countermeasures." Therefore, the authors fall back
ultimately on the contention that the P3oo response would be a suitable
measure, as it appears and disappears within about two seconds after the
stimulus.52
Recent reports of experiments conducted in Beijing at the National
Laboratory on Machine Perception support the promise of this technique
in using event-related potentials (ERP) measurements, and is of
particular relevance for forensic work.53 The experimental subjects
(hooked to thirty different electrodes) were presented with nine faces,
three of whom were strange, and six of whom were familiar, and were
told to deny familiarity with three of the known faces (the "targets").
The subjects were told they would be penalized if the "computer" caught
them lying, and regardless of the actual ERP of the subjects, the
computer pretended to "catch them" five times out of the thirty times
them, Leonarde Keeler, patented his own version, and when the patent expired, began a commercial
training service for examiners. Although this produced a standardized, mass-produced machine,
Keeler's training methods were not oriented to scientific validation but rather to the desires of his
customers (employers and police departments) to maximize the chance of subject confession. Ken
Alder, A Social History of Untruth: Lie Detection and Trust in Twentieth-Century America, 80
REPRESENTATIONS 1, 22 (2002). Moreover, it is probable that the limited paraprofessional training of
polygraphers on Keeler's machine (or its descendants) would have the potential to create a network
effect that would make them resistant to hardware changes away from the design on which they were
trained.
50. Gershon Ben-Shakhar et al., Trial by Polygraph: Reconsidering the Use of the Guilty
Knowledge Technique in Court, 26 LAW & HUm. BEHAV. 527, 530 (2OO2).
51. Id. at 532. Any somatic polygraph measures would also remain susceptible to the criticism
that stray thoughts or other stimuli could induce arousal that would be very difficult to distinguish
from that correlated with cognitive activity, whether or not this arousal was intentional.
52. Id.
53. Fang Fang et al., Lie Detection with Contingent Negative Variation, 50 INT'L J.
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 247, 247 (2003).
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they responded54 (a feature apparently used to maintain the subject's
fear).
This particular protocol reveals a serious problem with the use of
P300 measure of "significance" in deception research. As Dr. Fang
astutely discusses, with regard to stimuli like faces, an orienting response
might occur to a familiar face because that would be something of
interest. However, it might be equally expected to occur when exposed
to the unfamiliar face of a stranger, thus making the equation of
"significance" with "knowledge" extremely problematic. Indeed the
Chinese researchers found that familiar and strange faces were not
distinguishable based only on the "orienting response."55 Fang and his
colleagues were easily and reliably able to use statistical techniques to
distinguish when a "target" face had been presented and the subjects had
denied knowing this person by combining the electrical activity of all
thirty electrodes. Other electrical measures showed a distinguishing
pattern, and this complex statistical signature-rather than the "orienting
response" -served as the functional and neural basis for the deception
marker. Because of the experimental design, fear or indeed anticipation
of detection might explain much of the electrical signature, along with a
greater amount of cognitive activity devoted to deception related efforts,6
such as self-control . Consequently, although the Fang method may be
relatively useful in detecting deception as to whether one knows another
person, any ability to make inferences between brain and behavior have
been sacrificed in order to achieve the clearest marker of deceit. 7
54. Id. at 249.
55. Id. at 252-53.
56. The subjects were instructed specifically to "keep their minds calm" in order to avoid
detection. See id. at 249. Since any cognitive activity directed to this end would increase electrical
activity, following this advice would actually contribute to the observed effect. Although this confuses
the scientific interpretation of the result, it would be useful in practical terms because it suggests that
many polygraph countermeasures that could control items like blood pressure still require cognitive
effort and so would be much less effective against ERP detection.
57. The feigned ignorance paradigm is difficult to apply in most criminal investigations or civil
trials, particularly given the discovery and disclosure rules governing these proceedings. Nevertheless,
its applicability is perhaps wider than realized. In the United States there is a relatively small amount
of research into what one might call "forbidden knowledge." For a distillation of commonly held
norms, see NICHOLAS RESCHER, FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
COGNmON 9 (1987) ("There seems to be no knowledge whose possession is morally inappropriate per
se. Here inappropriateness lies only in the mode of acquisition or in the prospect of misuse. With
information, possession in and of itself-independently of the matter of its acquisition and
utilization-cannot involve moral impropriety.") In other words, it would incriminate a subject if he
were shown to be familiar with bomb-making equipment and procedures, given that he was under
suspicion of misusing this knowledge, and familiarity with classified or proprietary information is
punishable as probative of complicity in its unlawful transfer. This criminalization of knowledge can be
much more expansive in an authoritarian political system, making the use of knowledge detection
technology potentially pervasive. Especially when combined with a lack of concern about false
positives, it would be relatively straightforward to obtain results indicating a subject's mere
recognition of forbidden writers and passages of their works, banned religious rituals or symbols,
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It is unlikely that such an atheoretical approach to understanding
deception will be satisfying scientifically or legally. Despite the claims of
those using ERPs to detect "information" stored in the brains of the
subjects, in fact only a responsive orientation reaction is usually detected,
and this is correlated only in a rather loose way with whether the
information has already been encoded. Without observing the actual
processes of memory encoding and memory retrieval, as they pertain to a
stimulus (i.e., whether the former or the latter occurs), it remains
speculative whether or not the stimulus was present in the brain prior to
its presentation. More fundamentally, even if in a particular context a
global EEG signature can tell true from false responses, without
understanding the basis of this difference, it becomes difficult to know to
what extent the result can be generalized, or to what extent other
behaviors (outside the limited range available in a laboratory
experiment) could produce the same result. Logically, the only way to
doubly dissociate deception is to observe and understand the anatomical
correlates that are required to implement the deceptive act-the extra
processing steps necessary to deceive as opposed to giving a similar but
honest behavioral response. Then, a priori, we could ask if in the
particular context in which credibility is assessed, those functions would
be called upon by a deceptive response. If so, we could, in effect, watch
the lie as it was being constructed.
C. FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING, ESPECIALLY USING MAGNETIC
RESONANCE
Having now argued that for purposes of assuring scientific validity,
detection of deception will require functional neuroimaging, at least in
the medium term, 5 it then remains to describe more fully the limits and
capacities of these techniques as they are currently practiced. The main
methods are positron-emission tomography (PET) and magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI), but I will concentrate on the latter for several
outlawed works of art or media broadcasts, or even suppressed or "enemy" languages. Clearly such
interrogation about the contents of one's mind would (among other things) violate the freedom of
thought protection at the core of the First Amendment. See Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power SyS., 269
F.3d 703, 717-18 (6th Cir. 2001). For an initial assessment of magnetic resonance imaging in this light,
see Sean Kevin Thompson, Note, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in Intelligence
Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 16os, 1615-18 (2oo5).
58. One efficient way to solve the specificity problems associated with ERPs would be to
simultaneously record an EEG trace while the subject is undergoing a neural imaging scan. If in fact
the neuroiinaging is able to specify a distinctive activation pattern for deceit, it would then be possible
to use it as a standard against which one could measure patterns of electrical activity on the skull.
Then if one or more of these patterns possesses a precise correlation with actual brain states during
deceptive activity, it would be possible to dispense with the MRI equipment in later studies that were
essentially replicating the circumstances where the EEG-MRI relationship had been established. Since
none of the preconditions for this shortcut have yet been fulfilled, I consider it useful to concentrate
on identifying the brain-behavior relationship using MRI.
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reasons: (i) although the use of PET predates the use of MRI, the
hardware involved in the latter is far less expensive and now much more
common, (2) the temporal and spatial resolution of MRI is superior,
allowing easier correlation of short-duration events with specific regions
in the brain, and (3) most determinative for legal use, PET involves,
among other things, the injection of radioactive tracers into the blood
stream, which for clinical use strictly limits the amount of PET scanning
one can do on an individual, and probably bars it entirely from use as a
quasi-deposition technique that any United States court would
countenance."
MRI scanning, as done in most major hospitals, is non-invasive; it
uses a very strong magnet and directs radio waves at the subject's body.
For neural imaging by MRI the subject lies on a table, with his head
surrounded by a large magnet. The magnet causes some of the protons
within the atoms inside the subject's brain to align with the magnetic
field. A pulse of radio waves is then directed at the patient's head and
some of it is absorbed by the protons, knocking them out of alignment.
The protons, however, gradually realign themselves, emitting radio
waves as they do. These radio waves are captured by a radio receiver and
are sent to a computer, which constructs the brain image. The patient
cannot sense either the magnet or the radio waves; in fact, the patient
only knows the machine is working because of the noise it makes during
scanning. Different parts of the brain respond to the radio waves
differently, and emit slightly different radio signals depending, among
other things, on the local water and fat content. This provides a picture
of brain structure.
In order to use an MRI scanner to view the functioning brain as it
responds to a task, the following important but not heroic assumptions
need to be noted. First, there is the general cognitive neuroscience
premise that particular types of cognitive activity can be reliably
associated with specific areas of the brain, and that some of those areas
in fact provide the neurological machinery for carrying out the cognitive
task. As indicated by the caveat, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish
between parts of the brain whose stimulation is correlated with a
cognitive event and those that actually process it. For instance, speaking
involves, among other things, hearing one's own words, so the auditory
portions of the brain are normally active during speech production.
These areas are not, however, necessary for speech production, since the
hearing impaired (either clinically or experimentally induced) can in fact
accomplish this task, albeit with less fluency. Second, it assumes that
active portions of the brain during the task can be identified by an
increased amount of blood flow to those areas during the task. In order
59. See CoGNmvE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 29, at 138-39.
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to operate, brain tissue requires oxygen carried by blood hemoglobin. If
an area has increased demands for oxygen, the circulatory system
responds by increasing blood flow (and thus hemoglobin and oxygen) to
the area. What fMRI actually measures is the ratio of oxygenated
hemoglobin to deoxygenated hemoglobin, 0+/0-, which is possible
because the deoxygenated hemoglobin responds more readily to the
magnetic field emitted by the machine.
Obviously, there is a small time delay between any event calling
upon greater cognitive resources, the response of neurons in some region
with increased electrical activity, and then what is actually measured, a
circulatory adjustment coupled to the increased cellular demands in that
area of the brain. An event can be identified as having occurred within
about a two second window.6° What studies have shown about the
circulatory, or hemodynamic, response to neural activity is the following:
in the first couple of seconds of processing, the activated brain region
uses the oxygen at hand, and the 0+/0- ratio falls from the baseline
state; after that, blood flow increases and in fact "overcompensates" by
providing more fresh oxygenated blood than the tissue can absorb, and
hence the 0+/0- ratio increases and stays above baseline while the
region is actively working.6' In actual physical terms, the hemoglobin in
the area under observation becomes less sensitive to the magnetic field
of the fMRI. (This can be confusing because most pictures of an active
area represent it as glowing colorfully-while the machine actually is
measuring activity by the lowered emission of energy in an active area
now flooded with less sensitive molecules). The key measure is usually
reported as the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) effect,
measured by subtracting the difference between the background
activation shown in the area prior to the task from the level of activation
during the task. That is, where the researcher has shown a BOLD effect
in an area, that area is implicated by the stimulus or task.
D. NEUROIMAGING OF DECEPTION
Because much of the previous discussion has focused on the attempt
to discover whether a subject is familiar with a particular piece of
information, it is worth noting that preliminary studies directly
investigated whether a subject can falsely deny such familiarity.
However, these direct investigations, which I will refer to for
60. Luis Hernandez et al., Temporal Sensitivity of Event-Related fMRI, 17 NEUROIMAGE iO18,
1025 (2002). The brain should return to a baseline state within about twenty seconds, which is
therefore the spacing required between stimuli whose effect is to be separately assessed (as for
instance in a series of deposition questions whose answers are to be monitored).
61. COGNrrVE NEUROSCfENCE, supra note 29, at 94. This is almost certainly because the key
demand during brain activity is for the blood to remove the by-products of metabolic activity rather
than to supply energy and oxygen.
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convenience as the Langleben (2002) Study 6' and the Lee (2002) Study,6,
do not exhaust the relevant neuropsychological research in this area. The
encoding of memory, one part of which seeks to distinguish processing of
novel and familiar stimuli, has been a central focus of cognitive
neuroscience from its start, and has continued during the current era of
functional neuroimaging studies. This research involves comparisons of
stimuli seen for the first time and stimuli that have become familiar
through previous presentation .6' Novelty-driven activation in various
parts of the brain has been repeatedly demonstrated for scenes, words,
object-noun pairs, word pairs, and line drawings.6 5 Similar results have
been obtained for faces: when a novel face is encountered, the left
prefrontal cortex is activated along with the hippocampus (which is
involved in many memory storage operations); whereas when the face is
recognized later, completely distinct regions of activation are seen in the
prefrontal cortex but not the hippocampus. 66 In fact, recent fMRI studies
have been able to distinguish among new items, familiar items from a
memorized list, and words the subject falsely believes to have been on
the list.6'
Consequently, it seems highly likely that any form of malingering
with regard to specific information should be detectable by observation
of brain responses, because even good-faith mistaken responses in this
area are detectable. While memory impairment is perhaps too simple to
debunk, malingering more generally is an active and increasingly
successful area of research, particularly with regard to testing claims of
pain or paralysis. 68 In subjects actually incapable of motion, areas of the
brain responsible for initiation of motor activity are silent, while fakers
show activation in the prefrontal cortex, apparently where they issue
commands to inhibit the motion by conscious effort. Quite apart from
any use this application might ultimately have in assessing credibility by
62. D.D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-Related
Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 727 (2002).
63. Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, HUMAN
BRAIN MAPPING 15, 157, 159 (2002).
64. Craig E. Stark & Larry R. Squire, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) Activity in
the Hippocampal Region During Recognition Memory, 20 J. NEUROSCIENce 7776, 7776 (200O); John D.
E. Gabrieli, Functional Neuroimaging of Episodic Memory, in HANDBOOK OF FUNCTIONAL
NEUROIMAGING OF COGNmON 262 (Roberto Cabeza & Alan Kingstone eds., 200i).
65. Gabrieli, supra note 64, at 268, 273; see also Endel Tulving et al., Novelty Encoding Networks
in the Human Brain: Positron Emission Tomography Data, 5 NEUROREPORT 2525-28 (1994).
66. COGNrrIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 29, at 338.
67. See id. at 340-41. The false items are "implanted" by having the subject memorize a series of
words such as "thread, pin, eye, sewing, sharp, point, haystack, pain, injection." Most subjects will later
be convinced that they saw "needle" on this list, but an fMRI can show a different pattern despite this
subjective belief. Id.
68. David Oakley et al., Differential Brain Activations for Malingered and Subjectively "Real"
Paralysis, in MALINGERING AND ILLNESS DECEPTION 280 (Peter Halligan et al. eds., 2003).
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measurement of familiarity with relevant details, neurological
examination by fMRI is of obvious forensic value, most clearly in cases
such as insurance fraud.
_. The Langleben (2002) Study
In the Langleben (2002) Study, participants were given an envelope
containing twenty dollars and the five of clubs, and were told they would
be allowed to keep the money if they could keep the identity of the card
a secret from "the computer."' The computer displayed pictures of
different playing cards on a screen inside the MRI machine, and asked if
the subjects had the card, to which the subjects responded by pressing a
"yes" or "no" button in their hand. (In fact, they always responded
"no"). Significant differences were identified in a variety of areas
between the pattern of brain activity when they truthfully denied having
other cards and when they falsely denied having the five of clubs.7"
However, no attempt was made to examine the subjects on an individual
basis to classify them as truthful or deceptive. It was suggested that areas
showing greater activation indicate that lying required greater activity in
areas responsible for "executive" functions or decision-making, as well as
in premotor areas required to suppress or inhibit forelimb movement
(presumably to press "yes").
Phan and his colleagues recently replicated a number of the findings
of the Langleben (2002) Study, using a purposefully similar structure of
having people deny possession of playing cards (although they did not
reward participants for successful deception).7 Several areas of the brain
were more active when lying-none were more active from the baseline
condition when telling the truth.7" The Phan replication, which used
fourteen subjects, did find one area of the prefrontal cortex activated by
69. As the study notes, one difference between this experiment and actual deception
circumstances is the lie is in some sense permitted. See Langleben et al., supra note 62, at 728.
However, this could also be true in certain conditions where the individual believed he was acting
morally for ideological reasons, was self-deceived about the truth status of the statement, or was
essentially amoral. In an individual who believed he was violating a social norm, however, any
activated regions for deception would be accompanied by those cognitive areas responsible for what is
behaviorally termed a "conscience" or "morals." Although it would be beyond the scope of this
Article, the identification of this neural area is of legal interest, since under certain theories of
responsibility the activation of this region is considered to enhance "responsibility" leading to an
increase in punishment. Somewhat paradoxically, the failure to activate the region during proscribed
conduct is often considered, with justification, to bespeak caution regarding the future propensity of
the subject to commit the conduct. Rather than extend this into the suggestion of how a full
neurological specification of conduct may clarify philosophical concepts, and thereby affect concepts
of criminal and civil liability, I note only that it is likely to do so.
70. See Langleben et al., supra note 62, at 730 (the areas showing greater activation were
Brodmann areas 1-4, 6, 8, 24, 32, 40).
71. K. Luan Phan et al., Neural Correlates of Telling Lies: A Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Study at4 Tesla, 12 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 164, 165-66 (2005).
72. See id. (the areas showing greater activation were Brodmann areas 8, 9, 2t, 22, 37, 40, 45, and
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all individuals when denying possession of the card, which they suggested
therefore might serve as a "neural signature for the generation of lies."
Aside from the inconsistent activation of this region in other studies, a
confound of this study was the attempt of the researchers to simulate
"conditions of the polygraph" in order to make subjects feel "anxious";
thereby the fMRI results are tied to emotional responses (which as
discussed above, are inherently imprecise), rather than to the cognitive
challenges specific to deception. 3
2. The Lee (2002) Study
The Lee (2002) Study was a feigned memory impairment test, in
which subjects were told to intentionally do poorly on a test of recall.
They responded with a yes/no button. Subjects demonstrated activation
of areas responsible for memory recall, as well as for planning and
calculation (because there were only two responses, the test paradigm
forced the subject to keep track of how many wrong answers he gave in
order to approximate chance). They also showed an apparent inhibition
of the relevant motor area associated with responding through use of
their forelimb.74 As in the Langleben (2002) Study, it appeared there was
an instinctive movement or "pre-movement" toward the true answer,
which was suppressed. No individual variation or classification was done.
As with earlier technology exploring "guilty" knowledge, there is the
inherent problem of a subject possessing familiarity in an "innocent"
fashion. For instance, in the paradigmatic case with a presentation of
several firearms, one of which is a murder weapon, the subject may turn
out to show greater recognition of the weapon of interest, simply because
it is the most common of the set presented, or because the subject
himself possesses a weapon of that generic type.75 This complicates the
interpretation of such evidence, and weakens the strength of the
conclusion that can be drawn from a "test-positive" result, but any error
would be an inferential one, or arise through lack of proper rebuttal, and
would not be intrinsic to the method. Moreover, fMRI memory research
may be able to partially vitiate this problem to the extent it can detect
the context in which a subject became familiar with an item, in addition
to its mere familiarity. Thus, it is theoretically possible to distinguish
between someone who has become familiar with a person or item by
being shown it or told about it, and one who saw the person or item at a
73. See id. Although presumably certain emotional responses (and their reflections in neural
activity) do correlate more strongly with lying than veracity, the individual variation in this, as
reflected in the history of the polygraph, could easily create similar difficulties of interpretation and
implementation if transferred to a neuroimaging context. Therefore purposely introducing anxiety and
looking for it seems a somewhat questionable strategy for improving accuracy in deception detection.
74. See Lee, supra note 63, at 162 (the areas showing greater activation were Brodmann areas 6,
9, 10,21,23,40,46).
75. For more on this problem, see Ben-Shakhar et al., supra note 5o.
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particular place and time. 76 Were DDD evidence to begin to be employed
to validate memory claims, and counter-strategies of "inoculation" by
familiarization developed, context-retrieval would presumably become
of increasing importance, although it does not appear to have yet been
adapted for deception research.
The use of fMRI in the area of memory would have relatively little
impact on the legal process, at least in comparison with the use of
neuroimaging that would genuinely function as a "lie detector." For this
to occur, the technology would need to go beyond determining the
presence or absence of bits of information and actually distinguish
confabulated statements from "true" statements. In this context, "truth"
means more specifically a verbal expression of what the speaker actually
recalls from memory when prompted by a stimulus question, and "a lie"
means an alternative statement that the speaker has creatively generated
to take the place of the true expression facilitated spontaneously within
the brain by the stimulus. This area, the key one for assuring the veracity
of testimony, has now been the subject of four studies, all of which have
become available only within the last few years, and all of which purport
to lay the groundwork for the use of neuroimaging as a lie detector. I will
refer to these for convenience as the Kozel (2004) Studies,77 the Ganis
(2003) Study,7s the Spence (2001) Study,79 and most recently, the Nunez
(2005) Study.8°  These might be termed the first-generation of
investigations. At this writing, there are three additional research
reports, all currently in press, tying deception to brain patterns through
the use of fMRI. These investigations build on the initial studies, and
bring neuroimaging significantly closer to practical use as a DDD.
sI
76. See Ken Paller et al., Neural Correlates of Person Recognition, iO LEARNING & MEMORY 256
(2003) (showing specific additional networks activated when individuals retrieve "the spatiotemporal
context of the initial episode of viewing the face"); Scott M. Hayes et al., An fMRI Study of Episodic
Memory: Retrieval of Object, Spatial, and Temporal Information, 118 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 885, 885-
96 (2004) (describing detectable differences when subjects, after viewing a videotaped tour of four
houses filled with memorized items, were presented with objects in their original setting, versus
isolated or alternative settings).
77. F. Andrew Kozel et al., A Pilot Study of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain
Correlates of Deception in Healthy Young Men, 16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES
295, 295-305 (2004).
78. Ganis et al., supra note 23, at 830.
79. Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and Functional Anatomical Correlates of Deception in
Humans, 12 NEUROREPORT 2849,2850 (2001).
8o. Jennifer Marie Nunez et al., Intentional False Responding Shares Neural Substrates with
Response Conflict and Cognitive Control, 25 NEUROIMAGE 267, 267 (2005).
81. Two of the studies arise from the University of Pennsylvania group headed by Langleben, and
continue in the "feigned ignorance" paradigm employed by this group. See Ben-Shakhar et al., supra
note 5o, at 532; C. Davatzikos et al., Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with Machine
Learning Methods: Application to Lie Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE 663 (2005) (using computer analysis
on the results of the Langelben group's scans); Daniel D. Langelben et al., Telling Truth From Lie in
Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262 (2005); supra text
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3. The Kozel (2004) Studies
The Kozel research program has so far been the one most closely
tied to a simulated possible crime. In the primary study, the subjects were
taken to two rooms, Room i and Room 2; in each of the rooms were five
objects; beneath one of these five objects was a fifty dollar bill. The
subjects "discovered" the bills, but did not disturb them. In the MRI,
they were then shown pictures of the objects and asked if the bill was
hidden under them. This differs from the familiarity-based studies
reported above, because the subjects were "familiar" with all the objects
displayed. They responded "yes" by holding up one finger, "no" by
holding up two. As a control, they were told to respond truthfully as to
the objects in Room I and they would get the fifty dollars there. As to
Room 2, however, they were instructed to lie twice, denying the correct
hiding place, and then picking one of the four object locations and
affirmatively claiming that was the hiding place. If they successfully
deceived, they were told they would get the other fifty dollars.
As a group, the subjects showed greater activation in the "executive"
function area of the anterior cingulate cortex, as well as other areas,
when they were responding with a lie as opposed to when they were
giving truthful responses." Interestingly, however, in this study, each of
the eight subjects was individually assessed. One subject showed no
greater activation with regard to lying and truth-telling, and although the
other seven did, their activations were in quite heterogeneous parts of
the brain. Moreover, there was no area of the brain that was
differentially activated in all seven subjects so as to provide a "marker"
for deception.
In a subsequent replication of this research, using ten subjects,
aggregating the subjects once again allowed a statistical discrimination of
the lying brain, and showed-as a group phenomenon-similar
activation in areas such as the anterior cingulate cortex and prefrontal
areas.83 In this replication, the researchers also managed to get somewhat
more consistent individual results, in that seven of the ten subjects
showed greater activation when lying in the same general area of the
brain. What remained to be shown was that each of these individuals, if
retested, would show the same pattern, thereby allowing their responses
to be matched against a standard calibrated to that particular individual.
accompanying notes 69-7 o . In addition there has been a further research development by the Medical
University of South Carolina group headed by Kozel. See F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception
Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605 (2oo5). See also supra
text accompanying notes 79-81. This program has been more focused on clinically replicating the
circumstances of a crime accompanied by a false statement of fact.
82. See Kozel et al., supra note 77.
83. Frank Andrew Kozel et al., A Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception, 1i8
BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 (2004).
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As the researchers acknowledge, but have not yet addressed, interscan
variability even with the same subjects can be high," and this would be
extremely problematic if there is already sufficient inter-individual
variability such that reliable research requires an individual profile of
deceptive and truth brain states.
One of the ten subjects, for example, showed clear differences but
seemed to activate a different area of the brain, and as in the earlier
study, some subjects (here two out of ten) failed to show greater
activation when lying than when responding truthfully. Although this
suggests that some individuals could be assessed for deceptive responses,
it also carries the corollary that the process of deception could be
sufficiently variable among subjects that a certain percentage of the
population could essentially be immune from this type of examination.
From the legal perspective, this would not pose a significant problem so
long as this group could be identified and if it were difficult or impossible
for a person to make themselves immune through countermeasures.
4. The Ganis (20o3) Study
In the Ganis (2003) Study, the subjects were interviewed about their
work and vacation experiences. They were then asked to respond with
short verbal answers about where these took place. Sometimes the
subjects were asked to respond truthfully, sometimes they were asked to
respond with a prepared falsehood, and for some questions they were
asked to make up a spontaneous lie (although the lie was supposed to be
a plausible one-i.e., they were not to say they had spent their last
vacation "on Mars" or with a nonsense response like "purple
bookmark"). The spontaneous lies showed the greatest number of other
activated areas, and the prepared fabrication showed greater activation
in areas associated with the retrieval of episodic memory." No individual
investigation or classification of subjects was done, but the researchers
were well aware of this issue, stating that "whether fMRI can become a
useful tool for the detection of deception... depends on whether reliable
neural signatures of deception can be identified in single participants and
in single trials." 86
5. The Spence (2ooI) Study
Subjects in the Spence (2001) Study completed a questionnaire
before entering the MRI as to whether or not they had done certain
common activities that day. They then essentially "retook" the
questionnaire twice inside the MRI, one being asked by using an
auditory cue and once by visual query. At random, they were cued to lie
84. See id.
85. See Ganis et al., supra note 23, at 833 (areas showing greater activation in both deceit
paradigms: 7, 10, 36, and 37).
86. Id. at 835.
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on some of these responses. The subjects responded by pressing yes or
no on a keypad. These results were broadly consistent across the two
types of questioning, showing activation in areas responsible for the
inhibition of motor and other responses. ' This was consistent with a
short comparative delay in responding when the individuals were
required to lie. Individual subjects and possible heterogeneity were not
examined.
6. The Nunez (2005) Study
Broadly speaking, the Nunez (2005) Study was similar in format to
the Spence (2001) Study, in having the subjects initially fill out a "yes/no"
questionnaire, and then redoing the questionnaire while inside the
MRI.8 In this research, however, the subjects actually did the
questionnaire twice while in the scanner, answering truthfully to all
questions during the first scan and falsely to all questions during the
second scan. The results were generally consistent with the research
considered above by finding "there is increased neural activity within the
anterior cingulate [and] dorsolateral prefrontal cortex... when
individuals answer falsely as compared to truthfully." ' 9 Again, this was a
generalization, although individual results were not reported except to
note that reaction times were longer for all subjects when answering
falsely, it is apparent there was considerable variability in the nature of
individual brain activation. Interestingly, some of this variability was
found to be correlated with the results of a personality profile the
subjects took. This suggests that much of the variability among people is
part of the emotional "noise" that is associated with lying, and is
reflected in activation of different areas of the brain. The well-known
fact that people vary in their emotionality about falsehood-the very
reason that measures of emotionality such as the polygraph are so
limiting-is therefore implicated in interpreting the fMRI in order to
isolate those cognitively necessary components of falsification that are
invariant (or at least less variant).
7. Current Research
Second-generation research appears to be focused on overcoming
the problem of individual variation by developing a computer-assisted
classification of a set of markers (only some of which will apply in any
87. See Spence et al., supra note 79, at 2851 (areas showing greater activation in both deceit
paradigms: 6, 8, 32, 4o, and 47). Spence and his collaborators discuss their research paradigm and
results in Spence et al., supra note 22, at 1757-58, and suggest that the brain activation appears to be
less related to the "work" required to generate a false statement, than with the "work" required to
suppress or shunt the true statement away from its normal translation into a verbal response,
activation of the speech centers, and utterance by the motor pathways, even though the response in
their research was in fact non-verbal.
88. See Nunez et al., supra note 80, at 271 (areas showing greater activation: 6-1o, 32, 44-47).
89. Id. at 276.
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one case) as indicative of deception. Subjects are motivated by a reward
if they are successful in deceiving. This classification system is then
validated on a subsequent or separate sample to see whether or not it can
tell when these people are lying. That is, the data developed in the initial
phase of the study provides a guide for a prediction in the next phase of
the study. As mentioned, developing this sort of "litmus test" that can be
applied to a future novel subject is a necessary precondition for the use
of neuroimaging to evaluate testimony for legal evidence. The primary
areas of brain activation that go into constructing the models are broadly
similar to earlier studies.'
Langleben's model using the clusters of the brain associated with
lying or telling the truth, produced an ability to correctly classify 153/200
of the responses of four novel subjects, who repeatedly denied or
admitted possession of a "guilty" item. Obviously, this is far better than
chance, but also far from perfect. It produced a Type I error of false
"accusations" of lying 17/104 times or I6%, and it missed 33/96 lies told,
leading to a Type II error of 31%. When sophisticated machine-learning
methods were used to develop and weight the predictors in this study,
accuracy was considerably improved: when the computer developed a
model on 21 of the 22 original participants and used it to analyzed the
remaining person (doing this 22 times), the Type I error remained
approximately the same (14%), but the number of lies caught rose to
90% (a Type II error of io%).9
In the extension of Kozel's research, the individual subjects all
"stole" either a watch or a ring and then denied stealing each one, thus
uttering a truthful denial in one instance and a false denial in another
instance. The purpose of the scanning was to determine which item they
stole, which necessarily entailed an ability to discriminate between false
denials and true denials. Kozel and his collaborators prototyped the
system on thirty subjects, and then, using the predictors derived from this
phase, attempted to tell which item had been stolen by a subsequent-
group of thirty different subjects. Although wide individual differences in
the pattern and extent of activation were present, all thirty subjects
90. See generally Langleben et. al., supra note 81; Kozel et al., supra note 81. Langleben, who uses
denied knowledge, unlike other studies, finds areas of the brain activated by truth-telling over a
baseline condition. One possible reason for this is that truth-telling in this context involves the
"confession" of a relevant, ostensibly guilty fact, and therefore can logically be supposed to involve
more decision making and anxiety than normal truthful responses where the truth is not made
problematic for the subject.
9I. See Davatzikos et al., supra note 8i, at 665. Effectively, this meant that the left-out participant
was "novel" to the model built to predict their responses. It is notable, however, that since this
individual was in actuality part of the same experimental set-up, some sources of variation were absent
that presumably would have lowered the accuracy rate if a truly novel individual had been tested and




showed at least some differential activation while lying in one or more of
three anatomical clusters.92 When the relative activation of all three
clusters was combined to assess thirty-one novel subjects, it was able to
correctly predict which item had been "stolen" by them in twenty-eight
cases, or slightly above ninety percent accuracy.
Unless this technology is improved, we could not, however, expect
equivalent performance in a forensic setting, because in this clinical test,
the system "knows" the individual is lying-it simply has to guess which
of two statements is most likely to be the lie, and it is right ninety percent
of the time. These results are promising, but picking out whether there is
a lie and identifying the lie or lies within a long series of testimonial
statements represents different circumstances requiring the use of DDD.
Presumably, the Kozel system' could tell which of an individual's
statements had the least neurobiological indicia of veracity, but this
would only be a measure relative to the person's other statements rather
than to an objective measure of truth and falsity. The research assumes
away the most important element as far as court evidence is concerned:
whether or not the testimony in fact contains a lie.
8. Summary
Although the specific areas of the brain noted as indicative of a lie
differed substantially, there was some agreement among all
investigations to date that: (i) some form of "executive" function that
deals with conflicting pressures, generally the anterior cingulate gyrus,
was used to handle the "choice" of whether and when to lie, and (2) this
often acted with some form of inhibitory mechanism to suppress the
truthful response, whether that response was verbal or motor.' These
results are in accord with the theoretical prediction that witnesses will
have a relatively greater amount of difficulty fabricating testimony than
telling the truth.95
92. Kozel et al., supra note 81. These areas were the right anterior cingulate (Brodmann areas 6,8
and 32), the right orbitofrontal and inferior frontal (Brodmann areas 38 and 47), and the right middle
frontal (Brodmann area 46).
93. In a parallel to the early history of the polygraph, Kozel and his collaborators have apparently
licensed their technology for commercial forensic purposes. See http://www.cephoscorp.com. We can
only hope that the lessons of the polygraph's commercialization can be a guide to avoid the pitfalls of
technology stagnation.
94. Cf. Spence et al., supra note 22 (coming to a similar conclusion regarding the presence of
executive differences and inhibition of truthful responses as a common feature of early studies,
because truthfulness is the "baseline" and the brain must make extra efforts to respond in some other
way, as partially evidenced by the failure of most studies to show areas that are more activated by
truth-telling than by telling lies). But see Langleben et al., supra note go; Kozel et al., supra note 9o .
95. This comparative difficulty in increased "cognitive load" is directly and quantitatively
measured in an MRI context. However, it also provides the basis for the successful use of cross-
examination against an untruthful witness, who will generally lack the cognitive capacity to generate
false memories quickly and with the same detail and consistency as true memories, a limitation the
skillful cross-examiner exposes. Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of
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In a very recent study, Raine and his colleagues have provided
another line of confirmatory evidence in this regard .9 In line with
traditional clinical neuropsychology, they attempted to find biological
differences between a normal control group and individuals known prior
to the study to be "liars." Both liars and controls were recruited from
"temp" agencies in Southern California, and twelve liars were identified
by psychological tests that indicated regular use of "conning" others, use
of aliases, psychopathic personality characteristics, and false claims of
illness to acquire disability benefits. These liars showed an average
increase of twenty-two percent in the amount of "white matter" in their
prefrontal cortex and a decrease in the amount of grey matter, which the
researchers hypothesize as involving respectively, an increased capacity
to confabulate items and a decreased inhibition about doing so." In any
event, this anatomical differentiation among persons (as opposed to
differentiation among behaviors) is supportive of both the biological
locus of lying and the potential for identifying it. 
98
Despite the theoretical soundness of MRI deception research
generally, the current divergence between the tasks posed and the results
obtained suggests that no single overarching marker of deception is likely
to be soon identified. However, even with regard to simple lying, a
unique marker has not been identified. This in itself appears to be
remediable by use of statistical methods that can incorporate multiple
predictors, but it does not solve the problem of whether a particular
person, who might have a reasonably unique pattern of activation during
deception, can be evaluated for truthfulness. Most tellingly, in the only
study to break apart individuals the individuals all showed distinct
patterns of activation during deception. It is therefore probable that the
other studies also contained a large amount of individual variation
hidden within their group reports. Because all of the above were in effect
pilot studies, it will be interesting to see whether replication of the
experiment will show-at least on the group level-the same areas of
activation during deception.
Of particular importance to legal application would be a study so far
apparently not performed. That is, if a particular individual was retested,
it would be of interest whether on an individual basis the differential
levels of activation could be replicated, or if in effect people lie in
Cognitive Error, 57 STAN. L. REV. 291, 319-23 (2004).
96. Yaling Yang et al., Prefrontal White Matter in Pathological Liars, j87 Barr. J. PSYCHIATRY 320,
321 (2005).
97. See id. at 323.
98. An interesting study melding the two approaches, in order to deal with individual variation,
would seek to find out if habitual liars lie in a different way than "controls" do. This seems likely as a
theoretical matter, and would allow for the elimination of some of the noise in fMRI studies, since the
set of markers would be tailored for those classified as habitual liars and for the rest of the population.
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different ways on different days. The studies so far demonstrate that lies
are distinguishable-in gross-from honest responses using
neuroimaging. However, if the results are not reproducible, despite
holding the subject and the experimental paradigm constant, there is
serious doubt that the technique will soon be ready to operate as a lie
detector. On the other hand, because the Kozel (2005) Study in
particular shows the predictive power of a previous study in a subsequent
one, there is some evidence consistent results can be achieved under
those controls, and a challenge to the credibility of a crucial witness using
fMRI should be scientifically feasible and legally cognizable, perhaps
after some level of calibration for that individual's variation.
II. A MODEL FOR ADMITTING DETECTION OF DECEPTION EVIDENCE
What fMRI does, at least with regard to issues of memory, is simply
strip off further the layers of assumption and non-specificity that attach
to the "guilty knowledge" or feigned ignorance testing paradigm. Rather
than relying on merely an empirically-derived construct such as the
"orienting response," it is now possible to see the brain react to new
information in a way distinctive from the reaction to material that is
familiar." As with the polygraph and the EEG used to detect concealed
knowledge, there will be an argument that the cases are rare where this
type of information will be useful,"° or where the examined party will not
already have been given access to the material details and become
familiar with them through means of discovery. However, the duty to
disclose adverse information can be regulated by the court in the
following way: if a party discovers material evidence, and an opposing
party witness' familiarity with it is probative of an issue in the case, then
under certain circumstances, the witness could be examined for this
familiarity before the truth about these facts is revealed. Criminal
defendants, of course, would be protected against such examination by
their right against self-incrimination, but in circumstances where they
might be innocent, they should share an incentive to take the test with
the prosecution (which clearly has a greater belief in their guilt).
Once a particular neural pattern is validated as indicative of memory
or deception, then the recognition of this pattern on a series of
neuroimages can occur by computer, or by someone independent and
99. There is considerable evidence that the brain will react differentially to familiar information
even if it has been consciously "forgotten" and it is not retrievable. This relates to the challenges of
having neuroimaging overcome deception that is bolstered by self-deception, which, for cognitive
science purposes, means simply that little or no cognitive effort is required to suppress the "true"
answer to the question.
too. But see FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note it, § 19-3.4.2 (arguing that once a guilty knowledge test
"breaks through" as courtroom evidence, that law enforcement and others will begin to gather
material at the outset of the case that can be used to implement it).
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unfamiliar with the purpose of the test. The time stamp of the image is
then synchronized with the time sequence of the examination and
questions and responses are correlated. Expert testimony would be used
to explain the nature of the technique, the criteria used for scoring, and
the background assumptions. Cross-examination or rival expert
testimony would then be introduced focusing on issues such as the error
rate, possible contamination, invalid assumptions and so forth. All of
these types of challenges occurred (and continue to occur, although
usually with more precision) on the uses of DNA technology. Nor is it
difficult to believe that this process, as absurd as certain of the challenges
to DNA now seem in retrospect,'"' served to refine the process and
presentation of DNA evidence in court. Whether evidentiary challenges
impeded or improved forensic use of DNA, they certainly did not halt it.
Over the last decade, this process along with technical advances in DNA
sequencing have converted this technology to the "gold standard" for
identification," ' even displacing the traditional bias toward eyewitnesses,
which the courts now clearly consider to be less reliable.
In a certain manner, the neuroimaging of a subject's information
state is merely the converse of the collection of DNA traces left behind.
Just as it is difficult for an individual to interact with the external world
without affecting it, and leaving behind his distinctive genetic pattern in
the form of spent surface cells, each distinctive part of the external world
leaves its mark on the human body, acting on the cellular level to imprint
a trace of itself. Formerly, only those comparatively rare parts of the
external world possessing the capacity to adhere to the surface of the
subject (fibers, mud, semen, etc.) were able to imprint themselves as
evidence of the subject-environment interaction. The distinct auditory,
visual, olfactory or tactile properties of an environment, although sensed
and recorded by the subject, could not be accessed without accessibility
to those cells (brain cells) acted on by these features.
As to deception, or misleading per se, it is less clear how or when
neuroimaging will prove its worth. A thoroughgoing evolutionary
approach, which sees deception as basic to the adaptations underlying
language and thought, would be expected to predict a "module" for
deceit recognizable when activated. The difficulty in finding this module
is that we do not turn deceit off and on the way we might the reflex to
sneeze. Rather, the potential for multifarious deception may be so deeply
ioI. See, e.g., United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d I144, 1154 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting claims made
by academic commentators that DNA matching failed tests of general acceptance and relevancy and
had unknown rates of error).
IO2. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note itI, at § 25-1.2.1 (recounting the furious evidentiary debates
that surrounded DNA through the early 199os and concluding that "in little more than a decade, DNA




embedded in our social decision-making that it is simply not possible to
distinguish it from the ordinary way in which we communicate where we
"modulate" what we say, how we say it, and what we do not say, in order
to convey the desired impression. A recent meta-analysis of 1,338 cues of
deception appears to indicate this is indeed the case, and there is a
significant psychological gray area between truth and deceit." Therefore,
any global measure of deceit detectable in the brain would be like the
behavioral indicators of deceit and be better assessed as a continuous
rather than discrete variable. As a practical matter for neuroimaging,
therefore, it is quite unlikely on the current facts that we could reliably
detect when someone is "shading the truth" or "misleading" because
those states could not be objectively specified as processing or
transmitting information in a way distinct from ordinary social
communication. 4
Somewhere in the middle of plausibility is lie detection, and this is
where the focus of current research is likely to be. As there have only
been exploratory studies, only of few of them replicated, and all of them
with significant limitations, nobody is likely to be able to walk into a
courtroom tomorrow and challenge an opposing witness to spend an
afternoon in a magnetic resonance chamber. On the other hand, at the
basic level of distinguishing a group of lies from a group of honest
answers, these tests do work. Moreover, there is a scientific rationale in
the form of an argument for why they should. Lies as informational
products require more processing steps or inputs, in most instances, than
truths."5 If a lie is called for, it appears that some executive or "conflict-
resolving" portions of the brain must hold in working memory both the
honest answer and the proposed lie (whether retrieved or made up on
103. Bella M. DePaolo et al., Cues to Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74, 105 (2003).
104. No one familiar with developments in the area of cognitive technology can be unaware that it
is likely to pose significant privacy issues in the future. When neuroimaging becomes more accurate in
detecting deception than the polygraph, one non-libertarian justification restraining the use of the
deception detection will be abrogated, thus requiring a more direct confrontation between individual
rights and institutional desire to know. The theme of this Article is that testing be initially developed
in the limited and more controlled circumstances of court cases where the technology is critical to
accurate adjudication. For reasons of cost and the substantial burden imposed on employees, quite
apart from the novelty of the technology, it is unlikely that most employers would resort to functional
neuroimaging in order to investigate or screen their employees. In particular, there would be no
reason to alter the Employee Polygraph Protection Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2oo9 (2ooo). If courts deem
neuroimaging unreliable, the rationale of the Act (that employers not be allowed to use a bogus lie-
detector as an intimidation tactic) remains valid. However, if courts rule-as I believe is inevitable-
that some types of this evidence are sufficiently reliable, the need for independent employer use
remains dubious, since many deterrent ends would be achieved simply by the credible threat of a
potential legal action (i.e., for conversion where embezzlement is suspected) and a court-supervised
form of evidence would be available. Hence, it is unclear to me that a slippery slope argument directed
against my proposal has great force. On the other hand, I reiterate that potential uses of neuroimaging
for investigatory purposes by state authority might well be more prone to abuse.
105. See Spence et al., supra note 22, at 176o.
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the spot) and compare the two. In addition, the true answer and the
associated motor activity that would communicate it must be inhibited.
Based on the limited results of the recent studies, it appears these tasks
are accomplished differently depending on precisely how they are
framed, and it may well be that different individuals accomplish them
using different neuroanatomical structures.
Nevertheless, there is some hope that, for instance, an individual
subject's pattern of honesty or deception could be reliably identified. As
in the "control-question" method in polygraphy, the subject would be
asked to generate a certain number of known lies. The neuroanatomical
correlates to these events would then be compared (in a blind test) with
those corresponding to his known truthful answers. The statements as to
which his credibility is in doubt would then be classified to see into which
category they would fall. This avoids many of the pitfalls inherent to the
"control question" technique as now practiced by polygraphers, because:
(I) it does not depend on arousal but on the similarity of cognitive
demands, therefore making it less susceptible to confounding influences:
and (2) the outcome is a complex pattern of activation-if there is some
irrelevant psychological influence such as stress that causes the target
questions to be different than the known truths, this influence would be
far more likely to generate a third distinctive pattern than it would the
pattern corresponding to the known lie, meaning a minimum of false
positives. I will speculate regarding the admissibility of this type of
evidence in the future, assuming a modest development of the
technology along the lines I have just outlined.
A. THE FRYE STANDARD AND THE CONTRAST WITH POLYGRAPHY
Many states continue to adjudicate the admissibility of scientific
evidence under the principle of "general acceptance" in the relevant
field. In this respect, at least as to methodology, functional neuroimaging
has significant advantages over the polygraph. Although what
constituted the appropriate reference group for polygraphers was always
a matter of acrimonious debate, the fact that the majority of
psychologists never accepted it as a valid instrument was one of the
primary bases for its exclusion under the Frye standard.
By contrast, fMRI research not only is common throughout what is
undoubtedly the relevant field, cognitive neuroscience, it is closely
related to the general use of MRI in many different disciplines. Thus the
fact that an fMRI measures how a brain reacts to an event would be
"generally accepted" under the Frye standard. I 6 In addition, the ability
lo6. See Kulynych, supra note 30, at 1265 ("For neuroimaging, the general scientific consensus is
that most methods of PET and MRI scanning consistently produce useful information about brain
status, within the known limits of temporal and spatial resolution for a given technique.").
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to infer the differing effects on a brain between a novel and a familiar
stimulus would likewise be generally accepted, as issues of learning and
memory are the central focus of cognitive neuroscience, and the match
between behavior and structure activation is relatively well developed in
this area.
What would be more questionable would be any general acceptance
of whether a particular neural pattern corresponds to a lie. It would have
been theoretically possible for any of the past studies on this question to
show a distinct pattern that, based on validity of the technology and the
statistics used, would be generally accepted. However, this did not occur,
and the initial researchers did not claim this. In my speculative example
where a single individual is tested and retested, yielding consistent
differences between lies and truthful answers, the question would be a
close one, but assuming that a distinctive pattern was shown for
statements known to be untrue, this research-considered apart from its
conclusions -does not deviate from the normal practice in clinical
cognitive neuroscience that measures the responsiveness of single
subjects to stimuli such as pharmaceuticals. It would therefore also be
likely to find "general acceptance," in part because a cognitive
neuroscientist would a priori expect that the cognitive operation of lying
would produce some distinctiveness on a neuroimage, even if it might be
too subtle or variable to be of use (this latter problem being overcome by
the rigor of the research).
B. SCIENTIFIC STATUS OF FMRI UNDER RULE 702
Under the federal rules, a cognitive neuroscientist could testify as to
either memory or deception, provided that "(i) the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case."'" Again, with regard to
memory, the result of this step of the inquiry would clearly pass the test
of admissibility, at least so long as the test was conducted with due regard
to the individual variation in brain structure activation. This would
require matching neuroimages with stimuli known to be familiar and
unfamiliar to that person, before assessing the level of familiarity the
subject has with the item whose familiarity level is unknown and
relevant.
With regard to lie detection, although the principles and methods
would be deemed reliable, and presumably they would be applied
reliably, the evidence would fail on the first criteria, because there are
not currently any reliable "deception signatures" against which the
individual's neuroimaging result could be matched to say whether it was
107. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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or was not deceptive. (As noted above, current research is focused in
part on identifying multipart signatures by computer-aided pattern
recognition). Moreover, the particular brain structures implementing
deception, or alternative sets of structures varying among persons, have
not yet been identified in more than the most tentative fashion,
undermining any inference that activation of such structures in a
particular subject is indeed "deception." As under Frye, at least once the
foregoing scientific groundwork has been established, a researcher could
develop reliable data for the case on what counted as deception (for
instance, a set of data on known lies showing a distinct pattern with little
variation), and this application of generally accepted procedures would
be admissible for Rule 702 purposes.
Under the Daubert standard, now incorporated into Rule 702, a
court would inquire into testability, error rate, peer review and
publication, and general acceptance."' 8 Clearly any general hypothesis
about how a particular part of the brain generates behavior, or the
consistency of the neuroimaged response to a particular task, is testable,
and if posed as a general rule, falsifiable. To the extent the particular
technique has been applied for purposes of classification, the best error
rates from studies currently in press approach ten percent, although they
have, as mentioned, not dealt directly with the situation of an individual
being tested for veracity, and their error rate in this context is therefore
unknown. At the current time, the estimated error rate for any particular
pattern activation as indicative of lying, without calibration on the
individual, would be unacceptably high for admissibility. Because there
are literally thousands of event-related fMRI studies in the peer-
reviewed literature (although very few on deception), this would be a
relatively easy test, since this factor is generally seen as referring largely
to the methodology rather than the particular application."
The particular application to the assessment of deception, and more
precisely, to the case at hand, would instead be governed under the rules
laid out in Joiner, which requires that the expert testimony be able to
close the "analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered ....
Applying Joiner, the proponent would face several challenges. First, for
the admissibility of an opinion regarding the credibility of a specific
subject, the court should be shown that neuroimaging can in principle
identify lies, and second, a causal theory of why the particular structures
implicated as involving lies are in fact involved. As mentioned, any such
causal theory remains only in development, awaiting identification of
io8. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993). Compare for the
polygraph, David Gallai, Polygraph Evidence in Federal Courts: Should it be Admissible?, 36 AM.
CRiM. L. REV. 87 (1999) (answering this question in the negative).
io9. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note i i, at § 1-3.4.
iio. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
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those areas that are consistently shown to activate during lying.
However, there is at least the potential of making such a connection
between the data (an fMRI) and the process of forming a lie.
By contrast, it is generally considered unlikely that the polygraph, at
least outside the guilty-knowledge test, will ever be able to bridge this
gap. The most common technique of the polygraph, put simply, attempts
to detect deception by noting the difference in physiological response
between "control questions" and the "test questions" designed to elicit
legally relevant information. At the most fundamental level, the
difficulty is one of validity-in Joiner terms, there is too great a gap
between the method chosen and the inferences it attempts to make. Its
invalidity stems from a variety of sources, including what is often termed
"construct" validity-that there is no necessary connection between
differential response under the "control question" technique and
deception-the response may stem from stress, fear, surprise or other
sources activating the sympathetic nervous system, such activation being
the only thing the polygraph measures."'
Even if satisfying the scientific standard, it is likely neuroimaging
evidence will confront the attitude of the courts, alluded to earlier, that
the jury is to be the judge of credibility, and the use of experts in this
area is "invading their province." Procedurally, this is implemented as a
bar on the use of expert evidence on a witness's credibility."2 Not all
courts adhere to this rule, which, as one might expect, is related to
barring polygraph evidence, and those that do have a number of
exceptions. The main purpose of this rule, apart from keeping out the
polygraph, appears to be related to barring expert judgments about
character, rather than specific testimony about why a brain scan during a
particular statement has indicia of deception."3 The evidence presented
by the expert is about the scan, or perhaps at most the statement, and not
directly about the witness. Consequently, evidence of this sort allows a
jury to make its own assessment of the witness.
Iii. See generally Leonar Saxe & Gershon Ben-Shakhar, Admissibility of Polygraph Tests: The
Application of Scientific Standards Post-Daubert, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 203 (1999).
I12. See DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, EXPERT EVIDENCE
§ 1.5 (2004) (discussing this rule and its rationales, and noting that "when sufficiently valid and reliable
methods for diagnosing truthfulness in specific instances are developed,... the blanket rule should be
reexamined").
113. An exception along these lines might be comparable to that sometimes employed to admit
expert testimony about "false confessions" explaining why a confession made in police custody might
be untrue, although made. Considering indicia in confessions, or in the circumstances surrounding
them that casts doubt on their veracity, see id. at § 1.55 (discussing the trend to admit this sort of
testimony).
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C. LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY MAY BE PROPER FOR PURPOSES OF
RULES 402 AND 403
Scientific validity under Rule 702, as elucidated by Daubert/Joiner, is
only the threshold measure of judicially-determined reliability that might
permit such evidence to be lawfully used. It still remains to be considered
whether neuroimaging evidence can be projected to satisfy the remaining
strictures on presentation of material at trial."4 Because of the expense
involved, the amount of court time required, and the potential to confuse
the jury, Rule 403 would admit this evidence only in circumstances where
the evidence of credibility was particularly relevant (under Rule 402) and
probative of key issues."5 Three particular circumstances come to mind.
Because functional neuroimaging has achieved a greater level of
validation with regard to malingering, it may be called for in civil cases
where insurance fraud is suspected, for instance, if the plaintiff is suing
on a claim whose proof is founded on essentially his own testimony
regarding pain or impairment. Another class of cases that turns on
credibility is where evidence of the criminal defendant's guilt derives
primarily from an alleged accomplice or other potentially untrustworthy
source. In the latter circumstances, the impeachable witness could be
subject to a potential feigned ignorance test as to the details of the crime
scene he claims to have viewed or the context of the confession he claims
to have heard. A third type of case where current technology might be
obviously relevant would be in trade secret or patent actions, in which
the defendant may have to disclaim familiarity with the work he is
alleged to have misappropriated. Particularly when such actions verge on
industrial espionage,"16 in which blueprints, designs, or prototypes are
taken and misused, a party's credibility about unfamiliarity is both
material and potentially testable.
Moreover, in order to avoid neurological evidence overwhelming the
case, it could be limited in two other ways that some courts already
employ for polygraph testimony and therefore, a fortiori, would be
appropriate for a developed neuroimaging test of deception. First, the
testimony should be limited to impeachment only, rather than for its
substantive truth."7 In other words, neuroimaging during witness
testimony would call statements into question, but they would not
114. This is true whether or not the action actually proceeds to trial or is disposed of by pre-trial
summary judgment. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56(e) (requiring facts presented for adjudication by motion to
be "as would be admissible in evidence").
115. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury .. " FED.
R. EvD. 403.
116. Or international espionage for that matter, which would presumably explain why the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency is listed as providing funds for Langleben et al., supra note 81.
117. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d I529, 1535-37 (ith Cir. 1989) (allowing polygraph
evidence only for impeachment or corroboration).
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establish the converse of the statements (that the witness did in fact
know something of which he claims to be ignorant, or was ignorant of
that which he claims to know); his statements would simply be nullified.
Second, in order to admit this form of evidence to impeach, the
proponent of the evidence would have to show not only that credibility
generally was of key importance to the case, but also that the credibility
of the particular witness who he proposes to examine has been put in
question by at least some other form of evidence such as contradiction by
others or a reputation for untruthfulness. Given the foregoing
constraints, the evidence should be admissible under the basic hurdles of
Rules 402 and 403 or their state equivalents.
D. ADMISSIBILITY OF NEUROIMPEACHMENT SHOULD PROCEED UNDER
RULE 607
Assuming neuroimaging evidence is introduced for purposes of
impeachment, one might legitimately ask how to further classify it in
conventional terms, since the Federal Rules limit the type of material
acceptable for these purposes. If, as I propose, the proponent of the
evidence is seeking to use brain imaging to impeach, this is clearly
challenging the direct testimony of an opposing party with extrinsic
evidence going to the credibility of this testimony. In particular, it is
introducing an event, recorded by fMRI in which the witness made a
statement consistent with his direct testimony, but simultaneously with
making this statement, his brain state recorded that this statement was
not true (i.e., it showed novelty or familiarity where this was denied, or
alternatively, indicated the individual was lying).
Obviously, the rule on prior inconsistent statements does not apply
here, unless one stretches this term to mean that while the witness was
saying one thing, his brain was "saying" another. ' 8 Nor can one easily
argue for the use of Federal Rule of Evidence 6o8, as the test does not
bear on a witness's character for untruthfulness. "9 No one is able to offer
a competent opinion on the individual's character based on the previous
examination alone. Under 6o8(b) it might be possible to inquire into the
fMRI on cross-examination of the witness himself, as a "specific
instance" where the witness was untruthful, save that this rules bars
extrinsic evidence, which in this case would include the fMRI itself.
The way out of this legal puzzle for fMRI evidence is to admit the
evidence on the general ground of Federal Rule of Evidence 607,
because whatever else it might be, it is evidence tending to contradict a
statement of a witness.2' The evidentiary bar of "Rule 6o8(b) does not
118. FED. R. EVID. 613(b).
119. Admissible "evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness...." FED.
R. EVID. 6o8(a).
120. Impeachment by contradiction is properly considered under Rule 6o7, not Rule 6o8(b).
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apply.., when extrinsic evidence is used to show that a statement made
by a [witness] on direct examination is false, even if the statement is
about a collateral issue ..... Under this view, admissibility is present
because the verbal statement at trial is consistent or identical with that
given during pretrial examination. The extrinsic evidence of the fMRI is
admissible, as this contradicts the truth of the equivalent assertion
repeated by the witness at trial. At the time of the prior statement, the
contemporaneous fMRI had a tendency to show that the statement was
false when uttered. If the same statement is made, its veracity is put in
doubt by its relationship to the questionable prior statement. Since the
witness knows of this threat, he would presumably refrain from repeating
the deceptive testimony, but this places him in another bind, because he
can then be impeached with what he actually said under the prior
inconsistent statement rule for hearsay, even if he tries to remain silent
on the matter.12
E. INCENTIVES FOR TRUTHFULNESS AND PROGRESS BY STRUCTURING
ADMISSIBILITY
Assuming that the very early stages of research reported here
eventually produce a more reliable method of assessing witness
credibility, its gradual introduction will have to take account of the
incentives of the litigants and, ideally, encourage them to choose tests
that will be more, rather than less, accurate. According to the
assumptions of the model, the adjudicator will prefer truth to falsehood,
as will at least one party in the dispute. The other party will usually
prefer falsehood,'23 whenever his expected chance of winning is less than
fifty percent. If there is a certain amount of uncertainty about the test,
then the parties' willingness to have it performed will depend on their
individual assessments of the test outcome. If those assessments are
equally optimistic or are risk-prone, then there will be a possibility of a
joint stipulation regarding the results. If the parties are risk-neutral or
risk-prone, however, one of them will have no interest in pursuing the
DDD option without further legal adjustments. Because of the nature of
techniques such as fMRI, particularly in a feigned ignorance paradigm,
4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6o7.o6 (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2005).
121. Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 3o F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342 (D. Kan. 1998) (citation omitted); see
also Velasquez v. Leonardo, 898 F.2d 7, 9-10 (2d Cir. 199o) (impeachment with extrinsic evidence
proper to contradict testimony on fact material to case).
122. See United States v. Gajo, 29o F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding that inconsistency under
FED. R. EVID. 8ol(d)(I)(A) "may be found in evasive answers.... silence, or changes in positions"
(citation omitted)).
123. Governmental representatives, of course, have been given incentives to favor truthful
outcomes, and other legal and social norms regulate the extent to which even lawyers in civil matters
can encourage false beliefs.
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the test could in fact be ordered-and should be ordered-to prepare the
expert evidence prior to the trial. The initial evidentiary showing
described above should be made in pre-trial motions, specifically arguing
that the proposed method of testing credibility satisfies the rules for the
introduction of scientific evidence, that the credibility of a witness to be
so tested has already been put at issue, and that the credibility of this
witness is sufficiently material to the outcome of the case as to warrant
the use of an examination by MRI.
For convenience, I will call the source of the substantive evidence
"W," who offers up statement "S." When S is uttered by W, it will be
denominated "Sw." The opposing party-and potential proponent of
impeaching fMRI evidence-will be "X," the cross-examiner, whose goal
in the evidentiary context is to rebut or minimize anything offered by W.
In part this occurs by attacking the general credibility of W, his character,
background and reputation. In part this also occurs by focusing on the
inherent likelihood of S, apart from the fact that it is coming from the
mouth of W. Finally, and this is where DDD can be employed, X will
attack the specific credibility of Sw, by attempting to show that a
particular statement coming from that particular speaker should be
suspect. Under the polygraph paradigm, the proponent of DDD
evidence would usually have been W, testing himself, and it would be a
test-negative result that would be offered as either substantive or
corroborative evidence of the truth of S.. Hence this system favors any
test that is highly insensitive to deception or to the untruth of Sw, one that
would produce a large number of Type II errors.
In general, the impeachment value of a test-positive result on a DDD
in some particular instance, "D'," is determined by both the rates of
Type I and Type II errors, such that the probability of the Sw's truth, "T,"
given the result of the test, is defined by the following Bayesian
updating:'24
(I) Prob(TID') = (D'IT)
(IDIT + ID'Inot T})
The probability of the numerator shows that a result indicating deception
occurs during truth telling and is the false positive rate, while the
probability that it occurs with falsehood is I, which is the rate of false
negatives. This converts the above equation to a more easily
124. Bayesian updating involves the adjustment of perceived probabilities by the addition of a new
piece of information. Here, the critical question is the probability that the statement S is true. If S
bears indicia of truth when spoken by W while under examination by a DDD, this increases the
probability of the truth of S. How much this probability increases depends on the prior probability of




(2) Prob(TID') = false positives
false positives + (i - false negatives) (i - T)
Introducing one more piece of algebra, the false positive rate is
designated as "E," and the false negative rate as "E.." Ultimately it is the
sum of these errors, E, + E2, that a rational legal system should seek to
minimize over both the individual case, and over the progressive
development of more accurate techniques of adjudication and fact
investigation. The equation in that form becomes: 1
6
(3) Prob(T)ID+) = ET
ET+ (I- T)- E2(I - T)
The goal of rules of procedure and evidence would therefore be to
encourage each party, but in particular the party with most control over
the testing procedure, to have an incentive in the form of greater
expected utility for the reduction of E, and E . . If the utility of the parties
can be reasonably approximated by the changing likelihoods of a
favorable litigation outcome, I propose that the choice of test be given to
X, who has an incentive to minimize at least Type II error
(AU(X)/AE, < o).' Under Rule 403, the court is required to prevent
"prejudicial" outcomes. Here prejudicial outcomes would be
characterized as dependent on the possibility of "false positives," which
will fall in relation to both T and E,. Consequently, in order to avoid
exclusion on this ground, X will also have an incentive to choose tests
with a lower rate of E, and minimize Type I error (AU(X)/AE, < o), as
well as to preferentially apply tests only when T is already well below
125. These equations would also play into the initial evaluation of admissibility, as it would be the
burden of the testing proponent to show that there was (i) sufficient doubt about T (o<T<i), (2) a
likelihood that the marginal effect of a test-positive result would change T, and (3) that the rate of
false positives and negatives was sufficiently low that it would not overwhelm any inferences that
could be drawn from the test results.
126. A numerical example may provide clarification. Suppose the pre-test likelihood of a
statement, after an initial showing of credibility problems, is eighty percent. The rate of errors, both
false positives and false negatives, E, and E., is ten percent. Then if there is deception detected, the
new likelihood is .o8/1(.o8) + (.2 ) - (.02)1, or .o8/.26; in other words, there is now only approximately a
thirty percent chance of the statement being truthful. Thus, if this is the key issue in the case, the
preponderance of evidence W would have otherwise provided disappears. Readers can easily derive
for themselves that if T=i or if T=o, there is simply no point in conducting the test. Likewise, if the
error rates become high, the probative value quickly vanishes. However, even a test with a twenty
percent misclassification rate would be useful here, producing a conditional probability of the initially
plausible statement of .16/(.16 + .2 - .04) = a 50/5o proposition.
127. As mentioned, a Type II error in this context would mean the DDD registers no deception,
even though the witness is in fact being deceptive. This is the worst of all possible worlds for the cross-
examiner, since his use of the DDD has in effect "bolstered" harmful and fallacious testimony.
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one. By contrast, the current method of evaluating the admissibility of
DDD evidence has the witness W as the proponent of polygraph
evidence. Although W has the right incentives about Type I error
(AU(W)/AE, < o), it is difficult to get them aligned so as to minimize
Type II error. 1 8 A witness would like to be "validated" by the failure of a
DDD to register deception, regardless of whether or not they are telling
the truth; hence, if all else were equal, they would prefer relatively
insensitive devices with a high type II error.
Fundamentally, any test must be able to pick up the phenomena of
interest, and this is an issue of sensitivity. The probability of a false
positive is further reduced in the impeachment context if X is required to
bring in evidence of credibility problems of W before the test is
permitted. This could be a credibility attack of any of the kinds suggested
before: on the witness W, on the statement S, or on Sw, since ultimately
the impeachment relevance of attacks on the witness or on the statement
simpliciter exists only because of the probable connection they have to
the statement whose truth value is actually at issue. All else equal, it is
reasonable to assume that individuals with independent evidence against
their credibility will be more likely to utter an untrue statement. This
directly affects the overall rate of false positives (the numerator above),
which is determined by the background likelihood of true statements.
Call this foundational impeachment "M."
Moreover, the threshold requirement M of attacking W's credibility
by conventional means such as past convictions, prior bad acts, character,
or reputation will have the effect of-in those cases where the statement
tested is in fact true-of encouraging W's cooperation with the detection
of deception test. As the rules of procedure and evidence are currently
structured, this cooperation made by stipulation as to discovery by
neuroimaging would seem to be necessary in most cases, as an MRI
would undoubtedly qualify as a "physical or mental examination" under
the Federal Rules, which limits such examinations to parties or those,
such as children, under the control of parties.'29
128. E, is the false positive rate so its reduction reduces false positives by definition. In addition,
when Truth is more likely (T is close to i), there are more true statements on which an error leading to
a false positive can be made. For instance, if something were absolutely true, any register of deception
made while uttering it would be a false positive. By contrast, when the prior probability of T is low, a
result indicating "deception" is more likely to be associated with a statement that is actually false.
129. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a). This rule also allows such court orders only when "good cause" has been
shown and the examined party's "condition" is in question. Arguably, this language could be stretched
to incorporate the individual's veracity on a particular declaration since the physical basis for such
statements in terms of recall-or the lack of such a physical basis, indicating confabulation-can now
be potentially examined. The foundational impeachment would then be formalized as constituting the
necessary good cause. However, because of the ambiguities involved in this interpretation, and the




Because impeachment information M is as a practical matter very
damaging to W's credibility despite its dubious relevance to the truth or
falsity of his statement, W might be eager to bring evidence on the
statement. This is particularly so if by rule or as a practical effect a test-
negative result on a test chosen by his adversary X would disallow X from
introducing M (or some elements thereof) at trial. Thus X has to put a
certain amount of credibility-attacking material at risk in order to get the
benefit of neuroimpeachment. If W refuses to take the test, the
proponent of W's evidence'30 might well consider withdrawing W (as they
would do, presumably, if a deception positive result was obtained),
particularly if the court was able to issue an instruction regarding the
refusal to take the test that allowed a negative inference to be drawn
from that refusal.
The end result would be that in many circumstances, if the evidence
is collected "in the shadow" of a valid DDD, there will in fact be no
"battle of the experts" or "trial on how to conduct trials." There will be
less evidence actually introduced-including less bad evidence. The
credibility-challenged W may not be presented, and consequently neither
the foundational impeachment M, nor the neuroimaging, will ever be
seen. Alternatively, if W "passes the test," the foundational
impeachment will not be presented, and neither will the test-negative
result that nullified it, because the test-negative result "bolstering" W's
statement would not be admissible without a prior attempt at the
impeachment to which it responds.'3 ' Since the sort of material used for
foundational impeachment is not particularly accurate in any event, its
occasional loss should not be mourned-the best use of character and
reputation evidence may be in form of leverage, rather than presented as
genuinely probative of truth.'32 In neither circumstance will the jury ever
hear the term "fMRI." Magnetic-resonance evidence would only be
discussed if the proponent of W, despite his failure on the DDD (or an
instruction regarding his refusal to cooperate) decides to "fight the test"
(or justify his refusal) using expert testimony,'33 and as the tests improve,
130. Unless W is a party, the actual persons with an interest in the case are often in the same
informational position as X-they do not really know whether the crucial statement of W is true or
not, and their opponent's attack on W's credibility will normally influence the beliefs of everyone
involved about this fact.
131. Hence, even if one believed in the adjudicative value of the foundational impeachment, its
exclusion also excludes the rehabilitating result on the fMRI, leaving the parties in much the same
evidentiary state as they would be if there was no exclusion (at much less cost and confusion). Putting
M at risk is thus not only a way to create incentives for the parties, but also approximates what the end
result would be if the material M, used to open the door to neuroimaging, were responded to-as
would seem only just-by the countervailing evidence it had engendered.
132. See Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and
a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637,658 (I99i).
133. Recalling also that W will already have two strikes against his credibility in the form of
foundational impeachment and a test positive result, unless the credibility of W's testimony is
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this will become less likely.
FIGURE I. A DECISION TREE FOR IMPEACHING BY DDD
Putting this situation in an illustrative game-theoretical (extensive)
form, with payoffs to W and X equal to the probability of a favorable
verdict, the game between the parties might look like the accompanying
Figure I. In the particular example, even if W knows that Sw is false, he
will still marginally favor taking his chances with the test, so long as there
is even a minimal error rate, because this cannot be worse than a jury
instruction indicating W refused the offer of a test for deception. Of
course, if he knows S. to be true, he will certainly agree to the test. As for
X, he does not know whether Sw is true or not, but his decision is
absolutely crucial (when indeed the entire dispute hinges on this point), it is questionable whether it
would be worthwhile to make this fight.
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governed by .3T + .9(1 - T) > .5, meaning that so long as he thinks (in this
particular example) that there is at least a one in three chance that the
statement is false, he will go ahead with the test, despite the risk of the
loss of his foundational impeachment.'34
More generally, X will propose impeachment by detection of
deception where:
(4) [TE, + (I- E2)(i - T)] * [(prob (winning)[D+) - (prob(winning)IM)],
which equals the marginal gain in victory probability if the test shows
deception, thus "working out" for X, is greater than
(5) [T + E (i - T) - TE] * [(prob(winning)IM) - (prob(winning))],
which is equivalent to the marginal loss if the results of the test favor W.
Taking the probability of X winning and calling it "P," and multiplying
through, we are left with:
(6) (TE, + TE, + i - E )((PID)) - (PIM)) > (T + E2 - TE, - TE,)((PM) - P),
which further reduces to the following decision equation: X will use a
DDD if
(7) {(2ET - (2E.(I - T)) + i)(APID) > T(APIM)}
Equation (7) measures the comparative marginal improvements in
success made by the foundational material and the test-positive result,
and assesses the potential gains in a test positive result with the losses
(reversion to a baseline chance of winning) if a test-negative result
occurs. Because E, and E, must be less than one in any case where the
test would pass Daubert standards, and T is always less than one, X
would behave approximately as we would want him to, because the
previous equation (7) may be reduced to:
(8) (APID) > T(APIM)
If using the test gives a greater marginal gain in the probability of
winning than does using the impeachment evidence (discounted by the
background estimate of statement truthfulness), then X will use the test.
Taking the right-hand of the equation first, we see that as the
background likelihood of veracity (T) increases, the motive for
examination falls, and likewise, as the power of traditional impeachment
(M) increases, it becomes increasingly less likely that there will be resort
to neuroimpeachment. Now taking the left-hand of the equation, we can
see that the potential marginal improvement by DDD will obviously
create an incentive. However, as we know from prior equations (2) and
(3), the amount of new information one can extract from a DDD result is
134. In this equation, T is the prior probability as perceived by X, who puts at risk his foundational
impeachment; the expected marginal gain from a confirmatory DDD has to be greater than the
possible loss. In the numerical example, the inequality reduces to .6T < .4 or T must be less than two-
thirds to go ahead with the test.
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itself negatively dependent on both veracity and the rate of E,. In
addition, in this form, the more common-sense incentive for X to
minimize error rates showing no deception (E2 or test-negative results)
becomes even clearer, since the net marginal effect of an increase in E2
will make it less likely that the equation will be satisfied, and thus, that
neuroimpeachment will be warranted. Because cross-examiners are the
proponents of this type of evidence and have been provided with
incentives against error, there is some hope that the examinations they
propose will satisfy, or come to satisfy, the court. Even in the absence of
a compulsory process requiring their adversaries to undergo such
examinations, there will be some circumstances where they may
voluntarily agree to such investigations, either because they have almost
nothing to lose, or because their estimate or knowledge of their own
veracity exceeds that of their skeptical opponent.
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTIVE
... Jove, with Indignation moved,
At last in Anger swore, he'd rid
The bawling Hive of Fraud, and did.
The very Moment it departs,
And Honsty fills all their Hearts;
There shews 'em, like the Instructive Tree,
Those Crimes, which they're ashamed to see
Which now in Silence they confess,
By Blushing at their Uglyness;
Like Children, that would hide their Faults,
And by their Colour own their Thoughts;
Imag'ning, when they're look'd upon,
That others see, what they have done.
The Bar was silent from that Day;
For now the willing Debtors pay,
Even what's by Creditors forgot;
Who quitted them, who had it not.
Those, that were in the Wrong, stood mute,
And dropt the patch'd vexatious Suit.
On which, since nothing less can thrive,
Than Lawyers in an honest Hive,
All, except those, that got enough,
With Ink-horns by their Sides trooped off.
Bernard de Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees (1705)
The commitment of the legal profession to truth, although often
expressed, is likely somewhat deceptive. '35 This Article assumes that




society possesses an interest in truth, I36 and that the Anglo-American
adversary system purports to serve this interest; but common wisdom
supports and economic insight shows that the practicing lawyer has an
interest adverse to a reality that is transparent to all. The general
economic approach to litigation assumes litigation is preferred over
settlement only so long as the parties have different expectations of trial
outcome;'37 and a corollary is that a lawyer benefits in added fees by any
decrease in the rate at which the likelihood of success is revealed. All
members of the legal profession extract rents so long as mutual confusion
is maintained, and the skill of the litigator is revealed by his capacity to
"shift the odds" - that is, to distort the generic probability of success
under the law in a particular set of circumstances. The high-quality
advocate could not then gain a premium level of compensation, which he
fully maximizes by unleashing the acme of his skill only late and by
surprise (i.e., at trial), since his total compensation depends on the length
of the dispute, along with reputation. '38
Common prejudice often errs, however, in identifying the lawyer's
interest as lying, for this is not what analysis suggests; a successful lie
would lead to a determination of a state of affairs contrary to fact, but it
would lead to a determination. A lawyer's actual interest, all else equal,
is in the maintenance of indeterminacy of any state of affairs for as long
as possible.'39 It is little wonder then-to the cynic-that lawyers have, at
136. This is by no means an uncontroversial assumption, given the strong philosophical and
political tradition supposing an excess of truth to be harmful or fatal to social order, as Mandeville
exemplifies. So, in fairness, a note of caution is needed regarding the introduction of innovation
designed to increase honesty, although any harm done might be limited if honesty is confined to the
courtroom, even if this casts its "shadow" over ordinary discourse by creating disincentives for deceit.
Apart from concepts such as Plato's noble lie, there is, for instance, Pascal, who wrote: "Man is
therefore nothing but disguise, lies, and hypocrisy, both as individuals and with regard to others. They
therefore do not want to be told the truth. They avoid telling it to others. And all these tendencies, so
remote from justice and reason, are naturally rooted in their heart." BLAISE PASCAL, PENS9ES (Honor
Levi trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1670). Nevertheless, I am taking this point as a given, by
presuming that honesty has not yet reached superabundant levels in American society, and that if the
technology discussed here (or more likely, its distant progeny) actually threatened to create such an
oversupply, I have the perhaps naive faith that government and business would adapt to remedy this
problem of excess candor.
137. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 405 (2004) (discussing the
"divergence of interests" between lawyer and client as a barrier to disclosure of truth).
138. Of course, the lawyer must know the true expected value in order to abandon the case to
pursue other more lucrative opportunities if they present themselves. However, this points out the
tactical problem for the lawyer in revealing even information beneficial to his side, except at the end,
although a client's fears and possibility of settlement (or professional regulation) might force him to
reveal it earlier.
139. An interesting question is therefore raised as to whether the lawyer in the end favors false or
true outcomes. A false outcome may be less stable, thus offering greater potential for further gains.
However, there are disincentives attached to adjudicative falsity, since one or more participants may
be blamed for the error (by contrast, it would be very rare for someone external to the dispute to take
action against a lawyer for mere inefficiency). Therefore, I must respectfully disagree with Professor
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best, reacted unenthusiastically to any innovation that has threatened
their guild control of adjudicative fact. One telling point may be that in
the United States, where lawyers represent a more important special
interest group, there has been little movement to eliminate the civil jury
as has been done in the United Kingdom. Moreover, this system has
imposed on the "finder of fact," over the course of time, a requirement
of initial ignorance, which serves to lengthen proceedings and maintain a
legal monopoly on the transmission of relevant information into the
decision making process, 40 whatever laudable goals it might have. The
legal profession has been similarly lukewarm toward any mechanical
method of detecting witness deception that might compete with the
advocate's use of verbal cross-examination, which has the capacity to
upset the witness' self-presentation so as to induce a belief of
untrustworthiness'4' in the minds of the jury.
One argument often put forward in defense of the status quo is that
our evidentiary system is not solely about maximizing truth (or the rate
of truth production). This is most obvious with regard to both the
constitutional protection afforded to the criminal defendant, along with
the other scattered testimonial privileges, and the related asymmetric
risk averseness against Type I errors in adjudicating criminal liability.
Perhaps more relevant to the current inquiry, the system affords a certain
value to the privacy of information, such that the evidentiary value must
be worth the loss of privacy.4 For instance, the rules restricting the use
of character evidence generally, or those more specifically to do with
McGinnis' characterization of lawyers as "the enemies of the truth"; there are good reasons for them
to prefer truthful outcomes if forced to arrive at something, but they are "handicappers" of the truth,
perhaps taking both meanings of this term. Cf. McGinnis, supra note 135.
140. The most obvious exception to the law's cartelization of information is the criminal
defendant's capacity to testify on his own behalf or to represent himself, although this is a relatively
uncommon event and generally ends unfavorably.
141. Ideally, these aspersions are intended to be cast on the witness being examined, rather than
upon the questioner or his profession.
t42. In addition, the various sets of pretrial investigative restrictions in criminal cases also fall into
this category. For this reason, although the focus of polygraphs has been, and continues to be, on the
finding of a guilty party in a criminal investigation, I do not address this here. Since the standard of
proof is lower for an individual to be indicted than for him to be convicted, it would presumably be
appropriate at an earlier stage of fMRI accuracy to use the devices for such purposes and make the
results of an adversarial test cognizable by a grand jury-all else being equal. All else, however, is not
equal. The level of suspicion required for involuntary questioning by fMRI would presumably be at
minimum that required for any form of custodial interrogation. The procedure involved in integrating
the technology into this area therefore requires separate treatment. Tentatively, however, I should
note that there may be a possible difference here between imaging of memory activation and imaging
of false statement activation. It is only the latter that requires a statement and that directly implicates
the Fifth Amendment. A defendant may exercise "his right to remain silent" while still being shown
items, words or pictures to judge his nonverbal reaction. Could his brain be scanned simultaneously, in
the way he is now compelled to surrender a DNA sample? I admit this to be a difficult question, but




victims of sexual assault, can be seen in this light, as can Federal Rule
Civil Procedure 35, restricting the mental or physical examination of
parties, and the use of information so obtained.
These objections carry little weight with regard to the credibility of
already proposed witnesses. Such individuals have already either
volunteered their testimony or else the court has been sufficiently
satisfied with its potential value that they have been subpoenaed into
giving evidence. Therefore, the initial hurdle of their privacy has been
overcome before the question of impeachment, by neuroimaging or
otherwise, need even be broached. It is in getting the evidence of
witnesses to be admitted for its substance that procedure hems in the
truth-finding process. Once this point is reached, however, witnesses-
according to their oath-possess no right to conceal or to lie. In this local
component of the trial, the system does appear to seek a maximization of
truth, even if this is not quite so about the legal or trial process more
globally. Consequently, using neuroimaging as part of the assessment of
the crucial question of oath adherence has seemed to me to be an
appropriate entry point for the technology's use by the legal system.
The unconvinced might consider the irony of the current primary
restriction on cross-examination. Apart from distortion of the evidence
being impeached, the cross-examiner is somewhat constrained in the
manner of the examination by the desire to "protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment."'43 At the same time, it is perfectly
obvious that the premise of the display of the impeached witness to the
jury, and the jury's supposed role as lie detector, means that
impeachment serves two goals, both to reveal further substantive
evidence and to embarrass the witness (but not unduly) in order elicit
"demeanor" reactions from which the jury can (allegedly) assess
credibility. One consequence of the current proposal would be to make
less salient this latter aspect of the actual impeachment process at trial.
Pre-trial impeachment by neuroimaging, whatever its flaws, would be
less intrusive-or at least more private in its intrusion-than current
practice.
143. FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(3).
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